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UNIVERSITY  OF CHICAGO 
"Rules  vs.  Discretion"  after 
Twenty-five  Years 
1. Introduction 
From  time  immemorial  citizens  have  complained  about  their  govern- 
ments.  When  the government  is a greedy  despot  or the society  is com- 
posed  of  private  agents  with  conflicting  goals,  it  is  easy  to  see  why 
complaints  arise.  Twenty-five  years  ago  Kydland  and  Prescott  (1977) 
showed  something  more  surprising:  even  in  a  society  with  identical 
households  (with identical tastes and opportunities,  and the same choices 
to make) and a perfectly benevolent  government  (one that wants to max- 
imize the utility of this representative household),  in some circumstances 
bad outcomes  may occur. These situations  seem to involve  no conflict of 
interest, either among different groups of households  or between  the pri- 
vate sector and the government,  and the outcomes  are "bad" in the sense 
that better alternatives are obviously  available and seem to be-almost- 
within reach. Settings where this paradox arises include patent protection, 
capital levies,  default  on debt, disaster relief, and monetary policy. 
Two elements  are needed  to create such a situation. First, anticipations 
about  future  government  policy  must  be  important  in shaping  current 
decisions  in the private  sector. Second, there must be a public-good  as- 
pect-an  external effect-of  the private-sector  choices that are influenced 
by anticipated policy. 
In a setting  with  these  two  features,  even  a benevolent  government 
typically has an incentive  to mislead  the private sector about the policies 
that will be implemented  in the future, in order to manipulate  their cur- 
I am grateful to Ferando  Alvarez, V. V. Chari, Patrick Kehoe, Robert Lucas, Roger Myerson, 
and Christopher Phelan for useful  discussions,  and to the Research Division  of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis  for hosting  me during  a visit  where  much  of this work was 
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rent decisions  and  enhance  the external  effect.  After the private-sector 
choices have been made, the government's  incentives  put weight  on only 
the direct (contemporaneous)  effect of the policy. Thus, it has an incentive 
to implement  a different policy from the one announced.  If private-sector 
agents  are rational, however,  they  foresee  that the government's  incen- 
tives will change and refuse to be misled  in the first place. The resulting 
outcome  seems  bad  if the enhanced  external effect, which  must be  for- 
gone,  is large. All  agents  would  all be better off if all could  be  fooled, 
but rational behavior precludes this possibility: in equilibrium the private 
sector must anticipate correctly the policymaker's  incentives  and choices. 
Thus, the time-consistency  problem offers an explanation  for what  seem 
to be paradoxically  bad policy  outcomes.1 
A key  issue  in settings  where  the time-consistency  problem  arises is 
the ability or inability of the government  to make binding  commitments 
about future policy: Rules imply  commitment,  while  discretion  implies  its 
absence. Commitment  is important if anticipations  about future govern- 
ment  actions  influence  the  current choices  of  the private  agents  in the 
economy.  With the ability to commit,  the government  can tie the hands 
of its successors in a way that may improve outcomes. Without that ability 
the private sector fears-with  good reason-that  today's government will 
make promises  that its successors  will  refuse to honor. 
If commitment is lacking, a framework that incorporates game-theoretic 
elements  is needed  to model  the policymaker's  incentives.2 And as Barro 
and Gorden  (1983) showed  early on, such a formulation  also points  the 
way  to a resolution  of the problem: within  a game-theoretic  framework 
it is  easy  to  show  that if the  game  is  repeated  and  agents  are not  too 
impatient,  there are reputation  equilibria in which  the "good" outcome 
prevails  along the equilibrium  path. That is, a policymaker  can be disci- 
plined  by reputation considerations  even  if he has discretion. 
The time-consistency  issue  has been  intensively  studied  over the past 
twenty-five  years, and many of the main theoretical issues  have been re- 
solved.  Interesting substantive  applications  are, of course, still being  de- 
veloped.  But rather than review the theoretical literature again3 or attempt 
1. If the government  is not benevolent-if  it has objectives different from those of the private 
sector-the  same  incentive  to mislead  can arise. But with  conflicting  objectives  that is 
unsurprising.  What is astonishing  about Kydland and Prescott's examples  is that all par- 
ties seem to share the same objectives. This appearance is somewhat  illusory, in the sense 
that the payoffs of the private sector agents are symmetric, not identical: the private sector 
is not a "team." See Chari, Kehoe, and Prescott (1989) for a more detailed  discussion. 
2. Chari and Kehoe (1990) and Stokey (1991) offer two slightly different general frameworks. 
3. See Rogoff (1987,1989) for an excellent survey of the early literature, Persson and Tabellini 
(1994) for a discussion  of many applied  questions, and McCallum (1999) for a discussion 
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to survey  the applications  (which are too numerous  even to list), we will 
look  at two  issues  that remain. Both deal with  choices  about the policy 
regime  to be used. 
The first issue  is reputation building.  A policy  instrument  that can be 
monitored  more closely implies less frequent breakdowns  in a reputation 
equilibrium.  Thus, ease  of observability  is one  criterion involved  in the 
choice  among  discretionary  instruments.  Here we  will  look  at a central 
bank deciding  whether  to peg an exchange  rate or to set a rate of money 
growth.  The model  focuses  on the trade-off between  observability,  the ac- 
curacy with  which  the private  sector can monitor  the central bank's ac- 
tions, and tightness, how  closely  the instrument  is linked  to the object of 
ultimate interest, the inflation rate. We will show that the ease of monitor- 
ing an exchange-rate policy may outweigh  other costs it imposes  relative 
to a money  growth  policy. 
The second  issue  is the robustness  of a policy  mechanism  against mis- 
management.  One reason to prefer rules over  discretion  is that govern- 
ments  are not  always  as  intelligent,  benevolent,  and  farsighted  as  the 
Ramsey  government  found  in theoretical  discussions  of policy.  Policy- 
makers  who  are misguided,  greedy,  or myopic  sometimes  hold  office. 
Rules that are hard to change may offer protection against these less than 
ideal  types  of government  officials.  The robustness  argument  is one  of 
the motivations  in  Friedman's  (1948) recommendations  on  aggregative 
policy, and it is one that seems worth reviving. Many of the biggest policy 
blunders seems to arise from incompetence  or special-interest-group  pres- 
sures, rather than the classic time-consistency  issue.4 
Here we  will  look  at robustness  using  a model  in which  the type  of 
government  in power, Ramsey or myopic, changes randomly from period 
to period.  In this  setting  the  (farsighted)  Ramsey  government  faces  an 
especially  difficult task, since the possibility  of the myopic type adversely 
affects private-sector  behavior.  Hence  when  the Ramsey  government  is 
in power  it must distort its own policy  in a way  that offsets the policy  of 
the myopic  type. If the probability  of the myopic  type is high enough,  a 
simple  policy  rule can be advantageous.  A well-designed  rule places  an 
important restriction on the policy  of the myopic  type, while  leading  to 
only  a mild  change  in the policy  of the Ramsey type. 
4. There are many  examples  of policy  that was  arguably well  intentioned  but surely  mis- 
guided.  Cole and Ohanian (2001) argue that the National  Labor Relations Act was impor- 
tant in prolonging  the Great Depression  by keeping wage rates too high. The inflationary 
episodes  experienced  in many countries during the 1970s may offer another example. See 
Ireland (1999) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) for a further discussion.  Phelan (2001) 
offers an interesting model in which a government  that is greedy, but also intelligent  and 
patient, may  for long  episodes  behave  like one that is benevolent. 12  STOKEY 
These two  issues  are examined  in next two  sections.  The concluding 
section  discusses  some  of the results. 
2. Reputation  Building 
The ability of a government policymaker to establish and maintain a repu- 
tation for reliable conduct  depends  on how  well  the public  can observe 
his actions. A policy  instrument that is more easily monitored-one  that 
allows the private sector to detect deviations  from announced policy rules 
more easily-has  an obvious  advantage  in allowing  the policymaker  to 
build and keep a reputation. Hence observability is often a key issue. But 
a policy instrument that is more observable may be less tightly connected 
to the ultimate target, and consequently  there is a tension between observ- 
ability and tightness.5 
In a recent paper Atkeson  and Kehoe (2001) look  at the problem  of a 
central bank choosing between  two instruments for conducting  monetary 
policy.  The bank's  options  are to peg  an exchange  rate or to target the 
rate of money  growth.  If it pegs  an exchange  rate, realized  inflation  is 
equal to the rate of depreciation  in the exchange  rate plus  an exogenous 
shock term that represents the foreign rate of inflation. If the bank targets 
money  growth,  realized  inflation  is equal  to the rate of money  growth 
plus an exogenous  shock term that represents a domestic  velocity  shock. 
The central bank chooses its instrument period by period and may switch 
instruments  at any  time.  If any reversions  occur along  the equilibrium 
path, the most  severe punishment  is implemented. 
Notice  that with  either instrument  the object of interest-the  inflation 
rate-is  imperfectly  related  to the bank's  action. The exogenous  shock 
terms-the  foreign rate of inflation in the first case and the domestic  ve- 
locity  shock in the second-are  beyond  the bank's  control and  are un- 
known  when  the bank is making  its policy  decision.  In general the two 
shocks  will  have  different variances,  and those variances  are important 
inputs  into the banks decision. 
The two instruments  also differ along a second  dimension.  The public 
is assumed  to observe the exchange rate directly, so any deviation  is im- 
mediately  detected. That is, the exchange rate is assumed to be a perfectly 
observable  instrument.  Consequently,  with  the exchange  rate as the in- 
5. Observability  is  different  from what  most  authors  call transparency.  In discussions  of 
monetary policy  the latter is typically  used  to refer to the clarity with which  the private 
sector can observe the central bank's objectives.  The term observability  will be used  here 
to refer to the clarity with  which  the private sector can observe  the bank's actions. "Rules  vs. Discretion"  after  Twenty-five  Years  * 13 
strument there exist equilibria in which  the threat  of reversion disciplines 
central-bank behavior, but no reversions actually occur along the equilib- 
rium path. 
The money  growth  rate, on  the other hand,  is not  directly  observed. 
Thus, if the central bank uses  the money  growth  rate for its instrument, 
the private sector can only infer something  about its behavior by looking 
at the realized  rate of inflation.  Hence,  under  a money-growth  regime, 
(accidental) reversions cannot be avoided. As in Green and Porter's (1984) 
cartel model,  the imperfect monitoring  technology  is the source of these 
reversions. 
Atkeson and Kehoe show that if the central bank can commit to a policy, 
then  it chooses  the instrument  with  the  smaller  variance  for its shock. 
That is, with  commitment  only  tightness  is valued.  They also show  that 
if the central bank cannot commit, then it prefers to use the perfectly ob- 
servable instrument, the exchange rate, even if the variance of the foreign 
inflation shock is somewhat  larger than the variance of the domestic  ve- 
locity  shock.6 
In this section  we  will  look  at a slightly  modified  version  of Atkeson 
and  Kehoe's  model  that highlights  the main  conclusions.  First, we  will 
require the government  to make a one-time  decision  about which  instru- 
ment to use, instead of choosing  the instrument period by period. Second, 
we  will  use  reversions  to the one-shot  Nash  equilibrium  instead  of the 
most-severe-punishment  path. Third, we will formulate the model  in the 
classic  Ramsey  tradition,  as one  in which  the government's  objective is 
to maximize  the utility  of the representative  household.  Finally, we  will 
allow  an  alternative  version  of  the  inflation  process  under  a  money- 
growth  rule. 
2.1 THE  ECONOMY 
Consider  a central bank  choosing  between  money  growth  and  an  ex- 
change  rate as the instrument  for conducting  monetary  policy.  Suppose 
+  v =  =  e +  , 
where  1I is the money  growth rate, v is a velocity  shock, n is the inflation 
rate, e is the rate of depreciation  in the exchange rate, and r is the foreign 
rate of  inflation,  all in logs.  Assume  that the  shocks  v,  r are i.i.d.  and 
6. Of course, many other issues  affect this choice as well. For example, in an early contribu- 
tion Poole  (1970) focuses  on the sources  of shocks. 14  STOKEY 
Figure 1 REALIZED  INFLATION  RATE:  (a) MONEY-GROWTH  REGIME, 
(b) EXCHANGE-RATE  REGIME 
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independent  of each other, with means of zero and variances a2, oa >  0. 
Assume  that n and e are observed.7 
Under a money-growth  policy  the instrument is  i, the (noisy) signal is 
n, and the velocity  shock  v affects the realized  inflation  rate. Although 
e = n -  i  is observed, it is not useful in assessing the central bank's perfor- 
mance: e is a noisy  signal  about I,  and n is observed  directly. Under  an 
exchange-rate  policy  the instrument  is e, the (noiseless)  signal  is e, and 
the foreign inflation rate r affects the realized  inflation rate. 
Figure 1 illustrates the trade-off. Figure la  displays  the realized rate of 
7. To incorporate serial correlation in the shocks, define I  and e to include expected changes 
in velocity  and foreign inflation, respectively.  Then v and r, interpreted respectively  as 
innovations  in velocity and exchange-rate depreciation, are serially uncorrelated and have 
means  of zero. With serial correlation we  must  also ask whether  it remains reasonable 
to assume that e is perfectly observable. If the foreign rate of inflation is serially correlated, 
then e is observable  only if E[lrf], the central bank's forecast of the foreign inflation rate, 
is  observable.  If the  central bank  announces  its estimate  E[ntf]  each period,  and  if the 
private sector can verify this forecast independently,  then the model goes through without 
change. As Goodfriend  (1986) notes, a central bank's main forecasting advantage derives 
from its earlier access to data. But presumably the domestic central bank has little advan- 
tage in acquiring the data relevant for the foreign inflation rate. Hence  the assumption 
that the private sector can verify the bank's announcement  seems  reasonable. "Rules  vs. Discretion"  after  Twenty-five  Years  * 15 
inflation  under  a  money-growth  rule.  Since  the  actual  rate  of  money 
growth  (which is always  zero in equilibrium)  is not observed  by the pri- 
vate sector, the reputation equilibrium involves  reversions when the real- 
ized  inflation rate exceeds  some  (optimally  chosen)  threshold.  The small 
circles depict  situations  where  a reversion  is triggered. 
Figure lb  displays  the situation under an exchange-rate rule. The hori- 
zontal line is the actual rate of depreciation  in the exchange rate, and the 
fluctuations  around  it depict  the realized  rate of inflation.  The variance 
of realized  inflation is larger than under a money-growth  rule, but since 
the exchange rate is observed directly, no reversions occur. Thus, the opti- 
mal choice trades off the higher ongoing  cost of larger fluctuations under 
the exchange-rate  regime against the cost of occasional  reversions  under 
a money-growth  regime. 
A slightly more complicated  model of money  growth incorporates out- 
put growth.  Suppose 
t  =  (t  -  g)  +  U, 
where  i is money  growth,  g is real GDP growth  over the period,  and u 
is a velocity  shock. Let 
g  g  +  E 
be the central bank's  (imperfect) forecast of real growth,  where  E is the 
forecast error. Assume  that the shocks  ?, u, r are i.i.d. and independent 
of each other, with  means  of zero and variances  c2, G2Y,  (c  >  0. Under a 
money-growth  policy  the bank can be viewed  as choosing 
]L =  A -  ge, 
the excess of money  growth over expected real growth. For simplicity we 
will continue to call g the rate of money  growth. Assume  that the private 
sector cannot observe  ge,  but does  observe  pi and g. Then 
A  - 
g=L  +E 
is its signal  about the bank's action, and 
K  =  Ct +  E  +  U 
is the realized  inflation rate.8 
8. Our second model of money  growth is similar in spirit to Canzoneri's (1985) model. There 
the central bank was  assumed  to have  private information  about a velocity  shock; here 
it has private information  about real output  growth. 16* STOKEY 
Thus,  in both  models  of  money  growth  the  signal  about  the  central 
bank's action is noisy,  so reputation equilibria involve  reversions  ("pun- 
ishments") along equilibrium  outcome  paths. In the first model  the real- 
ized  inflation  rate is itself  the  signal,  while  in the  second  the  inflation 
rate is the signal plus additional noise. To capture both models  of money 
growth,  the  framework  analyzed  here  allows  two  shocks.  For the first 
interpretation one shock is set identically  to zero. 
In the next two sections we will characterize a certain class of reputation 
equilibria and calculate expected  payoffs  along the equilibrium  outcome 
paths. These equilibria are then compared  with  those  for the exchange- 
rate model.  Since the signal  is noiseless  under an exchange-rate  regime, 
no reversions  occur along the equilibrium  outcome  path. 
2.2 HOUSEHOLD  BEHAVIOR 
Under  a money-growth  rule the timing  of events  within  each period  is: 
1.  the government  sets the money  growth  rate LI; 
2.  each household  chooses  w, interpreted  as a rate of wage  growth,  in 
anticipation  of the current inflation rate; 
3.  the signal 
S =  +  ? 
and the inflation rate 
K =  gt +  c  +  U 
are observed,  where  ? and  u are the  exogenous  shocks.  In the  simple 
model  e  v and u  0. 
Let w denote the average rate of wage growth in the economy. The one- 
period  loss for a household  that sets the wage  w is 
L(w, wz,  n) =  a 
n2 +  (w -  n)2 +  d(w  -  a  -  )2, 
where  a  >  0, and where  a, b, d >  0 with  (a +  b +  d)/2  =  1 are relative 
weights. 
The household's  loss function has a "new Keynesian"  interpretation.9 
Suppose  each household  is the monopolistic  supplier  of a differentiated 
commodity  produced  with  labor as the only input. Since households  set 
9. See Ireland (1997) for a more detailed justification of a similar payoff  function. "Rules  vs. Discretion"  after  Twenty-five  Years  ? 17 
wages  before the current inflation rate is known, wages  are sticky for one 
period. 
Suppose  each household's  target wage  is  W =  (1  +  a)  P, where  P is 
the average price level  in the economy  and & is the desired  markup. It is 
convenient  to renormalize  units  each period  so P _  =  1, and let w  =  In 
W, n  =  In P,  and  a  =  ln(l  +  &). 
The first term in the loss function represents the "shoe leather" cost of 
inflation. It depends  only on the actual rate of inflation P/P-1,  and with 
the  chosen  normalization  it is  proportional  to  [ln(P/P_)]2  =  n2. 
The second  term represents  the household's  interests  as a consumer. 
Its surplus  is maximized  if other producers  set wages  at W =  P, and its 
relative  loss  is  proportional  to  [ln(W/P)]2  =  (z  -  n)2. 
The last  term represents  the household's  interests  as  a producer.  Its 
surplus  is maximized  if its wage  equals the target value,  and its relative 
loss  is proportional  to 
In  W  )  = (w -  a  -  )2. 
_(1  +  &)P  _ 
Notice  that p =  E[C|Ip]  is the expected  rate of inflation, conditional  on 
the value  i  for money  growth.  Let pa denote  the rate of money  growth 
anticipated by households.  Then ga is also the inflation rate expected  by 
households,  where  the word  "expected" encompasses  uncertainty about 
the central bank's action as well  as uncertainty about the shock. 
Consider  the expected  value  of the current period  loss  if ga is antici- 
pated  and  p is  carried  out.  Households  set  wages  at  w  =  a  +  a,  so  the 
expected  loss  is 
A(pa,  Li)  =  E[L(ga +  a,  ga +  ac, I +  ?  +  u)] 
=  a  2 -ba( -  b(  )  ++ b 
d(  - ga)2  +  M,  (1) 
2  2 
where 
M  =  G2 +  o2  +  ba2 
2 
is an unavoidable  part of the expected loss. The first two terms in A, which 
are exactly  as in Barro and Gordon  (1983), are important  for the incen- 
tive  constraints  for the  central bank.  The third term and  its  derivative 18  STOKEY 
vanish  when  households  correctly  anticipate  the  action  of  the  central 
bank, g1 =  g, as they  do  in equilibrium.  The last term, M, is important 
for cost comparisons  across instruments. 
The second  term in A can be interpreted as a Phillips-curve  coefficient. 
If households  anticipate an average  rate of inflation  val,  then the central 
bank  can  reduce  this  part  of  the  expected  loss  by  setting  the  money 
growth rate a little higher, g > j.  Of course, a higher value for ,  increases 
the first and third terms in A, putting a bound on the net gain from unan- 
ticipated  inflation. 
In equilibrium households  correctly anticipate the action of the central 
bank,  Ia =  g, so the expected  loss is 
A(g,  i)  -=  a2  + M. 
Consequently,  if the central bank could precommit, it would  set p = 0 to 
minimize  this loss. Call ,  =  0 the Ramsey rate of money  growth.  For the 
reasons  noted  above,  if  1a  =  0 is  anticipated,  short-run considerations 
tempt the central bank to set ,u >  0. 
Define  R1N to be the unique rate of money growth with the property that 
if gN  is anticipated by households,  so they set wages  at w =  pN +  a, then 
the  central bank has  no  short-run  temptation  to  deviate.  The latter re- 
quires  A2(gN,  tN)  =  0,  so 
N  boc 
a 
Call gN the Nash rate of money  growth. 
Let 
atN)gN  2  (ha)2  8  -  A(N,  N)  -  A(0, 0)  =  a(gN)2  (b)2 
2  2a 
denote the difference between the expected losses (over one period) under 
the Nash  and Ramsey money  growth  rates. 
2.3 MARKOV  EQUILIBRIA 
The game  described  above  is  infinitely  repeated,  and  future  losses  are 
discounted  by the constant factor P e  (0, 1) per period. If P is close to one, 
as we  will  assume  here, the repeated  game  has many  subgame-perfect 
equilibria.  We  will  focus  on  a particular  subset:  Markov  equilibria  in "Rules  vs. Discretion"  after  Twenty-five  Years  ? 19 
which  there are two  states, good and bad, that also satisfy some  other re- 
strictions.  In the  rest of  this  section  we  will  briefly  describe  this  set  of 
equilibria and sketch the argument for characterizing the subset that mini- 
mize expected  discounted  losses. A more detailed  discussion  is provided 
in Appendix  A. 
Each equilibrium  in the class  we  are considering  is  characterized by 
rates of  money  growth  (ge, Lb) for the  central bank  and  rates of  wage 
growth  (wg, wb)  for the representative household  for each state, and rules 
for updating  the state at the end  of each period.  These must  satisfy  the 
usual  equilibrium  conditions.  The additional  restrictions are twofold. 
First, we will  focus on equilibria in which  the central bank chooses  the 
Ramsey  rate of money  growth  in the good  state, ,g  =  0, and the Nash 
rate in the bad state, gb =  gN.  It then follows  immediately  that the rates 
of  wage  growth  chosen  by  households  are  ws  =  0  +  a  and  wb =  gN  +  a. 
Second, we will restrict the class of rules for updating the state. We will 
assume that only the current signal s is used and that it is used in a partic- 
ular way in each state. Specifically, if the economy  is currently in the good 
state, households  compare the signal with  a one-sided  threshold  Sg, and 
the  state  remains  good  in  the next  period  if and  only  if s  -  Sg. If the 
economy  is currently in the bad state, households  check whether  the sig- 
nal lies in a symmetric  interval around  gN, and the state reverts to good 
in the next  period  if and  only  if s E [gN  -  ?b,  gN  +  Eb]. The  simple  structure 
of these equilibria makes them appealing  candidates  for attention. 
The pair of thresholds  (Sg, ?b)  must also satisfy incentive  compatibility 
(IC) constraints for the central bank in each state. These constraints ensure 
that any deviation  from the equilibrium  rate of money  growth,  0 or gN, 
is unattractive to the bank. 
DEFINITION  Simple two-state  Markov  equilibria  are characterized by money 
growth  rates pg =  0 and  b =  RN,  rates of wage  growth  wg =  0 +  a  and 
Wb  =  tN  +  ,  and  updating  rules  that use  only  the current signal.  De- 
pending  on the current state, the state next period is good  if and only if 
s c  Sg or s E  [_N _  ?b, gN +  ?b], where  the  critical  values  Sg, ?b  O  satisfy 
the IC constraints for the central bank. 
The symmetric  form of the test in the bad state ensures  that the IC con- 
straint holds  in that state. The IC constraint in the good  state imposes  an 
additional restriction on the pair (Sg,  ?b).  We turn next to a brief discussion 
of that constraint. 
Instead of using Sg  and Eb,  it is convenient  to analyze the model in terms 
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the bad and q of a return in the other direction. It is also useful  to place 
a mild restriction on the distribution  of the shock ?. 
ASSUMPTION 1  E has a continuous,  symmetric, unimodal densityf(e)  with 
mean zero, whose  support is all of R. 
Under Assumption  1 the reversion probability p can be adjusted contin- 
uously  from 0 to 1/2  by adjusting Sg  from 0 to +oo;  and the return probabil- 
ity q can be adjusted continuously  from 0 to 1 by adjusting ?b  from 0 to 
+00.  Normal  distributions  with  mean  zero  satisfy  this  assumption  and 
will  be used  in the examples.10 
It is useful  to define the function 
y(p)  f(F-'(1  -  p)),  p E (0, 1), 
where  F is the c.d.f. forf.  Then ? =  F-'(1  -  p) is the value  for the shock 
that leaves  probability  p in the upper  tail, and f(E) is the height  of the 
density  function  at this point. Thus, y(.) maps probabilities in the upper 
tail into levels  for the density  function. We will also use the hazard func- 
tion, h(p) =  y(p)/p. 
Fix P and define the function 
1 
V(p, q;  q)  '1-  (1 -  p -  q) 
Recall that 6 is the incremental expected  loss from being in the bad state 
rather than the good  in the current period. If the switching  probabilities 
are (p, q), then &5(p, q) is the expected  discounted  value  of the (current 
and  future)  incremental  losses  from being  (currently) in the bad  state. 
That is,  ((p, q) takes account of all future switches back and forth between 
states, discounting  and weighting  them appropriately. Note  that y  is de- 
creasing in p and q: higher  switching  probabilities  reduce the difference 
between  the states. 
Fix the parameters (a, b, a) and the densityf;  let gN  = ba/a  be the Nash 
inflation rate, and let y, h be the functions defined above. The set of proba- 
bilities  (p, q) E (0,  /2] x  [0, 1] that satisfy the central bank's IC constraint 
in the good  state are those  for which 
y(p)p86(p,  q) >  ba. 
10. If there are equilibria with p>  1/2,  then there are also equilibra with p -  1/2,  and the latter 
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The interpretation is as follows:  increasing the money  growth rate above 
Bg = 0 leads to a marginal gain of ba in the current period and a marginal 
increase of y(p) in the probability of reversion to the bad state. The latter is 
multiplied  by  38&6(p,  q), the expected discounted  loss if a reversion occurs. 
Using h instead of y and rearranging terms, we can rewrite this constraint 
as 




Suppose  the pair (p, q) satisfies  (2). If the economy  is currently in the 
good  state, the expected  discounted  cost of future reversions  is  3Spyv(p, 
q). Hence  the  equilibria  that  minimize  expected  discounted  losses  are 
those that solve 
min  6ppV(p,  q)  s.t. (2).  (3) 
p,qE(0,  1/2]x[0,  1] 
Proposition  1 characterizes the set of equilibria that minimize  expected 
losses  among  all simple  two-state  Markov equilibria. 
PROPOSITION Let  f(E) satisfy Assumption 1. Then 
(i)  any pair (p, q) E  (0, 1/2] X [0, 1] satisfying (2) characterizes  a simple two- 
state Markov equilibrium; 
(ii)  the set of such equilibria  is nonempty if and only if (2) holds  for q = O,for 
some p e  (0, 1/2]; 
(iii)  a pair (p*, q*) attains the minimum expected  loss if and only if it solves 
(3), and a solution exists if the set of equilibria  is nonempty; 
(iv)  if (p*, q*) is a loss-minimizing pair and q* <  1, then the expected  loss per 
period, conditional on starting in the good state, is 
bro  C =  A(0, 0) +  *  (4) 
h(p*) 
(v)  iff(e)  is a normal  density, then the solution (p*, q*) is unique (if one exists) 
and q* =  0. 
The first and third claims summarize  the discussion  of (2) and (3). The 
second  claim follows  from the fact that Ny  is decreasing  in q. The fourth 
follows  from the fact that if (p*, q*) is loss-minimizing  and q* <  1, then 
(2) holds  with  equality.  If it did  not,  q* could  be  increased,  shortening 22 *  STOKEY 
Figure  2 EQUILIBRIUM  REVERSION  PROBABILITIES 
Reversion  probability  p 
reversions  and  further reducing  expected  losses.  To  illustrate  the  last 
claim we  turn to an example. 
Iffi)  is a normal (0, 7i2)  density, the associated hazard function is hi(p) = 
H(p) /  i, where H is the hazard function for a normal (0, 1). The function 
H is decreasing  for p  <  1/2. (Recall that p is the probability  in the upper 
tail.) 
Figure 2 displays  the function  P(p, q; 5)  =  ippx(p, q; P), for P =  0.99 
and  q =  0.0,  0.03;  and  the  function  ba/6hi(p)  =  2/g1Nhi(p),  for  iN  =  10% 
and oi = 0.8, 1.4. Suppose  (  = ol  = 0.8. The points E1 and F1 occur where 
the 2/1Nhl(p)  curve crosses  the  P(p, q) curves,  for q =  0 and 0.03. Call 
the x-coordinates  of these points  pin(q).  For each q, the IC constraint (2) 
holds  to the right of this point, so there are equilibria for p -  pmi(q). Re- 
ducing  q extends  the feasible  range for p downward,  reflecting the fact 
that the central bank's IC constraint involves  a trade-off: longer punish- 
ments  (lower q) permit less frequent punishments  (lower p). 
For each  fixed  q, the pair  (plin(q), q) minimizes  expected  discounted 
costs. And since a pair of this form satisfies the IC constraint with equality, 
the expected  discounted  cost of future reversions  is proportional  to the 
quantity on the vertical axis. Hence  the minimum  expected  loss  overall 
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The figure is qualitatively  the same for any parameter values, provided 
the shock ? has a normal distribution,  establishing  claim (v). For a  =  a2 
= 1.4 the (unique) minimum-cost  equilibrium occurs at the crossing point 
E*, again with  q* =  0. Notice  that increasing  a  raises the minimum  ex- 
pected cost: a less informative signal requires a higher reversion probabil- 
ity p*. 
Figure 3a displays  the optimal reversion probability p* as a function of 
the standard  deviation  a,  for Nash  inflation  rates of 3%, 5%, 10%, and 
20%.  Looking along each curve, we see that increasing the standard devia- 
tion  of the  shock-reducing  the accuracy of the  signal-leads  to more 
frequent  reversions.  Looking  across  curves,  we  see  that increasing  the 
Nash  inflation  rate-raising  the  cost  of  reversions-reduces  the  fre- 
quency of reversions. Figure 3b displays  the corresponding  thresholds for 
the inflation rate. 
The conclusion  that q* =  0 is a direct consequence  of the fact that the 
hazard function h(p) for a normal density is a decreasing function. It holds 
for other distributions with that property, but not in general. For example, 
suppose f()  has an exponential  distribution  in the relevant range, 
f(?)  = 
1 
e-  ,  ? >  0. 
Then the hazard rate is constant in the region  of interest: h(p) =  rl, p ' 
1/2.  For this  distribution  the curve  2/1Nh(p)  in Figure 2a is a horizontal 
line.  Hence  if there are any equilibria  at all, there are many  that attain 
the minimum  expected  cost, each with the form (p""(q),  q), q E Q*. These 
equilibria have  switching  probabilities  that rise and fall together. 
Alternatively,  if f has an increasing  hazard rate in the relevant range, 
then the cost-minimizing  equilibrium  is again unique  and has q =  1. 
2.4. OBSERVABILITY  AND TIGHTNESS 
With the characterization of the least-cost equilibria in hand, we  can re- 
turn to the central bank's problem of choosing  between  the two potential 
policy  instruments, money  growth and the exchange rate. Recall from (1) 
that A(0, 0) = M = a2 + o2 + ba2/2  is the expected loss per period, ignor- 
ing reversions.  Since no reversions occur under the exchange-rate regime 
and there is only  one shock, the expected  loss per period  is simply 
C e  =  -(  +  1 ba2. 
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Figure 3 (a) OPTIMAL REVERSION PROBABILITIES;  (b) OPTIMAL 
INFLATION THRESHOLDS 
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Under  a money-growth  regime  the expected  cost  of reversions  must 
also be included.  Consider first the simple  model  of money  growth.  The 
velocity  shock intervenes between  the money  growth rate and the signal, 
s  =  n  =  +  v, and  it is the only  shock.  Hence  ? =  v and  u  =  0, and 
Assumption  1 must hold for the velocity  shock. Let h* denote  the hazard 
rate in a cost-minimizing  equilibrium. Then the expected cost per period is 
cmg  =  2  +  1bc2 +  b 
2  h* 
Comparing  the two  costs, we  find that the exchange  rate is preferred to 
money  growth  as an instrument  if and only if 
ba. 
h 
If  ~ -  c2, then the exchange rate is obviously  preferred: it is both tighter 
and more observable.  If ay  >  02,  then the exchange  rate is the preferred 
instrument if and only if the higher cost from its looser relationship with 
the  target  (the higher  variance  of its shock)  is more  than  offset by  the 
expected  cost of reversions  under a money-growth  policy. 
Figure 4 displays  the tradeoff for  3 = 0.99, a Nash inflation rate of LN = 
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ba/a  =  10%,  and  the  four  values  ba  =  1,  2,  4,  8  for  the  Phillips-curve 
coefficient.  [The corresponding  weights  on the shoe-leather  cost of infla- 
tion, the first term in (1), are a =  0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.8.] The exchange  rate is 
the preferred instrument along and below the 45? line, where the standard 
deviation  of the foreign inflation shock is no greater than that of the do- 
mestic velocity  shock. In addition it is preferred if the former is somewhat 
larger than the latter, with  the exact position  of the separating curve de- 
pending  on the parameters. 
A higher value for the Phillips-curve coefficient ba increases the central 
bank's incentive to deviate under a money-growth  regime, increasing the 
size of the region where  the exchange  rate is preferred instrument. That 
coefficient measures  the gain from surprise inflation, which  in the model 
here is interpreted as arising because of monopolistic  (rather than perfect) 
competition  among  producers  (households).  But it can have  other inter- 
pretations as well. For example, it might represent the value of additional 
seignorage  revenue, or the benefit from devaluing  outstanding  (nominal) 
debt. 
For the  complex  model  of money  growth  the  signal  is s  =  t +  ?, where 
? is the error in the bank's  forecast of GDP growth,  and Assumption  1 
must hold for ?. Repeating the argument above and letting h* denote the 
optimal hazard rate, we  find that 
Cmg =  (2  +  (2  =  ba2  +  bo 
2  h2 
so the exchange  rate is the preferred instrument  if and only  if 
(2  -  (2 
_ b 
+  ba 
If c5  -  O2  + c2, then the exchange rate is obviously  preferred. Otherwise 
there is, as before, a trade-off between  tightness and observability. Figure 
4 still applies,  with  the axes relabeled: on the horizontal  axis is  ci,  and 
on the vertical is  U.|  -  62. 
With a normal distribution for e, the optimal punishment  length is infi- 
nite: q* = 0. Such an outcome  strains the imagination: presumably  a new 
central banker or a new  institution  altogether  would  be put  in place  in 
finite time. It is very easy to modify  the model here to deliver that result, 
by adding  a strictly positive  lower bound,  q0  >  0, on the return probabil- 
ity. The argument above proceeds exactly as before (cf. Figure 2), and the 
(unique) equilibrium  has q* =  q0.  The reversion length is random, and it 
is straightforward to calculate its expected value as a function of q0.  Since "Rules  vs. Discretion"  after  Twenty-five  Years  ?  27 
the additional  restriction operates on the money  growth  instrument,  the 
result is to enlarge the region of parameter space where the exchange rate 
is the preferred instrument. 
3. Robustness 
Not  all governments  are as benevolent  and clever as a Ramsey  govern- 
ment.  The possibility  that  the  government  is  "bad," which  may  mean 
greedy, incompetent,  or myopic, creates difficulties for a "good" (Ramsey) 
government.  Some  of the difficulties  are unavoidable:  a legacy  of large 
outstanding  debt, bad legislation, etc. can be difficult to undo. In addition, 
the behavior  of the private sector will  be predicated  on a certain appre- 
hension  about the nature of the administration currently in power. In this 
section  we  will  show  that if a "good" government  cannot easily  distin- 
guish  itself from a "bad" one, this mistrust by the private  sector makes 
its task more onerous.  In such an environment  a simple  policy  rule can 
be very  useful,  even  if it cannot respond  to shocks  in the environment. 
In the model  here, the fact that a rule reduces or eliminates  the potential 
damage  done by a "bad" government  has a very useful  effect on private 
behavior. This effect far outweighs  the small additional gain that a "good" 
government  could attain with discretion. As will be shown, even a moder- 
ate probability that the government  is "bad" makes the rule worthwhile. 
Suppose  that there are two  types  of governments,  Ramsey and "bad." 
Reputation  equilibria are delicate,  and  there are countless  ways  for the 
other type  of government  to deviate  from the Ramsey  policy.  Here we 
will  assume  that the  "bad" type  is myopic,  setting  current tax rates to 
maximize  current-period utility. The Ramsey government  behaves  in the 
usual fashion, raising revenue  in a way that maximizes  the expected  dis- 
counted  utility  of the representative  household.  For simplicity,  we  will 
assume  that the government's  type is i.i.d. 
The environment  is adopted  from Fischer's (1980) paper. Each house- 
hold receives  an endowment  of goods  that can be invested  or consumed 
directly. Invested goods  earn a return but are also subject to taxation. The 
household  can also  use  labor to produce  goods.  The government  must 
finance an exogenous  expenditure  sequence.  The tension  is between  the 
government's  short-run temptation  to use  a (nondistorting)  capital levy 
to finance current expenditures,  and the adverse  effect such a policy has 
on the incentive  to invest. The expenditure  sequence  is stochastic, and for 
simplicity  is taken to be i.i.d. 
First we study a setting where policy is discretionary. If the government 
is known  to be  the Ramsey  type  and  the  discount  factor is sufficiently 
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here,  the Ramsey  government  uses  a carefully  calculated  capital tax to 
finance part of spending  and to provide insurance against the high expen- 
diture  shock.  The capital  tax varies  with  the  expenditure  level,  but  its 
expected  value  is low  enough  so that investment  is worthwhile. 
If the type of government is uncertain, but the probability of the myopic 
type  is not  too high,  a reputation  equilibrium  still exists.  The policy  of 
the Ramsey government  is qualitatively  similar to the previous  case. The 
main difference is that the Ramsey government  must offer a high enough 
expected  return on capital during the periods when  it is in office to com- 
pensate  the household  for the fact that capital earns a negative  expected 
return when  the myopic  government  is in power. The policy  adopted by 
the  Ramsey  government  becomes  rather odd,  and  expected  utility  de- 
clines as the probability of a myopic  government  increases. The Ramsey 
government  is willing  to continue  participating  in this  equilibrium  be- 
cause abandoning  it means that households  stop investing,  which entails 
a substantial cost. (For sufficiently high probabilities reputation equilibria 
cease to exist, but here we will  focus on probabilities that are below  that 
threshold.) 
We then consider what happens  if, instead of allowing  the government 
discretion in setting fiscal policy  each period, the society  adopts a policy 
rule placing  an upper bound  on the capital tax. If the probability of the 
Ramsey type  is sufficiently  close  to one, this rule reduces  welfare,  since 
the insurance feature of a variable capital tax is lost. But if the probability 
of the myopic  type is high  enough,  the rule is welfare-enhancing. 
3.1 THE  ENVIRONMENT 
Each period  the household  receives  an endowment  of goods,  co, and an 
endowment  of time. It can invest  all or part of its goods  endowment  in 
a productive  activity,  and it can hide  the rest. Let 0 e  [0, 1] denote  the 
fraction of the goods endowment  that is invested.  Investments earn a rate 
of return r >  0, but they can also be taxed. Hidden  goods  earn no return 
but cannot be taxed. Time spent  working  produces  goods  according  to 
the linear technology  q =  we, where  w >  0 is an implicit wage  rate and 
f  is labor supply. 
Households  value private consumption  goods  c and time worked  f  ac- 
cording to a utility function that is additively  separable and linear in labor 
supply: 
U =  E  Zt[u(c(t))  -  (t)] 
,-t=0 "Rules  vs. Discretion"  after  Twenty-five  Years  ?  29 
Assume  u is strictly increasing, strictly concave,  and twice differentiable, 
and 0 <  P <  1. Assume  u'((l  +  r)o)  >> w, so that the household  chooses 
to work even  if it is consuming  its entire endowment,  with  interest, and 
faces a positive  tax on labor income. 
Government  expenditure  is exogenous  and  stochastic.  For simplicity 
assume  it takes  only  two  values,  g1 =  0 and g2 =  g  >  0, and  that the 
realizations  are i.i.d. Let nt  =  n and n2 =  1 -  n denote  the probabilities. 
In each  period  the  government  levies  flat-rate taxes  Tk E  [0, 1  +  r], 
'Te  [0, 1] on capital and on labor income.  The government  cannot issue 
debt, so its budget  must be balanced  each period.  Assume 
ro  <  (1 -  r)g,  (5) 
so that the required revenue cannot be raised with a capital tax that leaves 
the household  with a positive  expected return on investment.  For simplic- 
ity assume  in addition that g <  (1 + r)co,  so that the required revenue can 
be raised with  a confiscatory  capital tax. Finally, assume  that g is small 
enough  so that it can be financed entirely with a labor tax when the house- 
hold  hides  its good  endowment. 
3.2 RAMSEY  GOVERNMENT 
First consider an economy  in which  it is known  for sure that the govern- 
ment  is the Ramsey  type. We are interested  in settings  where  there is a 
reputation  equilibrium  of the usual  form. The tax policy  in that equilib- 
rium is the one  that the Ramsey  government  would  employ  if it could 
commit ex ante to fixed, state-contingent  tax rates. For discount  factors P 
that are sufficiently  close to unity there an equilibrium  of this form, sup- 
ported by the threat of a reversion  to the one-shot  Nash  equilibrium. 
Suppose  the government  could  precommit,  and consider  the problem 
of choosing  the optimal  tax policy  subject to the constraints imposed  by 
household  behavior.  In this stationary  environment  with  i.i.d.  expendi- 
ture shocks  and no state variables, the solution  is a stationary tax policy 
{(rei, 'ki),  i  =  1, 2} that maximizes  the household's  expected  utility  per 
period,  where  subscripts  i =  1, 2 denote  the values  of the tax rates, con- 
sumption,  etc. in the two  states. 
Suppose  that the  household  has  invested  all of  its  endowment,  and 
consider  its problem  after the state i has been  realized  and  the current 
tax rates ('ki,  'Te) are known.  Its problem  is 
max[u(ci)  -  ei] 
Ci,  ei 
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s.t.  i =  (1  +  r -  ki)O  +  (1  -  i)wi,  i  =  1, 2.  (7) 
The equilibrium allocation must also satisfy the market-clearing condition 
for goods: 
ci + gi =  wei +  (1 +  r)o,  i =  1, 2;  (8) 
and  the  government's  budget  constraint  (redundant,  by  Walras'  law) 
must hold: 
gi  =  TkiCO  +  tiWfi,  i  =  1,  2. 
Finally, notice  that the household's  net income  gain from investment  in 
state i is (r -  Tki)C.  The household  is willing  to invest  its endowment  if 
and only  if the associated  change  in expected  utility  is positive.  Hence 
investment  occurs if and only if the capital tax satisfies the rate of return 
constraint 
2  i u'(ci)o(r  -  ki)  0.  (9) 
i 
The Ramsey government's  problem  is 
max  ITi[u(ci) -  f]i 
i 
subject to (8), (9), and the constraints imposed by household  optimization. 
As  shown  in  Appendix  A,  the  solution  (0R, (cR, er,  tRi, tRi),  i  =  1, 2}, with 
OR =  1, has the following  features: 
(i)  consumption  is the same in the two  states, cR =  cR; 
(ii)  the labor tax is the same in the two  states, Ti  =  f2; 
(iii)  labor supply  is higher by g in the second  state,  2R  =  eR +  g; 
(iv)  the expected  capital tax is equal to the rate of return, Ji,i7Ti  =  r; 
(v)  capital is subsidized  when spending  is low and taxed when it is high, 
t,  <  <  T  <  . 
Features (i)-(iii)  follow  from the assumption  that utility is linear in labor 
supply.  Given  (i), result (iv) is an immediate  consequence  of the rate-of- 
return restriction in (9). Result (v) is an instance of the principle developed 
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in a stochastic  setting  can act as a perfect substitute  for state-contingent 
debt of the type  discussed  in Lucas and Stokey (1983). 
As in the monetary  model  of the previous  section,  the Ramsey policy 
can be sustained  as the outcome in a reputation equilibrium in which the 
behavior of the government  is disciplined  by the threat of reversion to the 
repeated one-shot Nash equilibrium. In the latter equilibrium households 
have no incentive  to invest.  They hoard their goods  endowment  and all 
spending  is financed  with  contemporaneous  labor taxes.  If spending  is 
low  the labor tax rate is zero, Tz =  0. If spending  is high  the labor tax 
Tz2  >  0 is set at the minimum  level needed  to raise the required revenue 
g. Any  capital tax policy  that violates  (9) can be used,  but no revenue  is 
collected  from it. 
Notice  that there are temptations  to deviate in both states of the world. 
In the low-spending  state there is a one-time  gain from setting both tax 
rates to zero, and in the high-spending  state there is a one-time gain from 
using  a large capital levy.  But for P sufficiently  close to one the Ramsey 
government  resists both temptations. 
3.3  MIXED TYPES (k >  0) 
The equilibrium  described  above  is valid  for an economy  in which  it is 
known  with  certainty that the government  in office is a Ramsey govern- 
ment.  Suppose  instead  that the government's  type  is i.i.d., and let X be 
the probability  of the myopic  type.  Let mx and Rx denote  values  under 
myopic  and  Ramsey  governments  respectively  in  this  mixed  environ- 
ment. We will look at equilibria in which  households  still have an incen- 
tive to invest  in the mixed  economy,  so O" =  1. If k is not too large and 
P is sufficiently  close to one, such equilibria exist. 
The behavior of the myopic  government  is straightforward. In the low- 
spending  state it sets both tax rates to zero,  kx =  Tx = 0; and in the high- 
spending  state  it raises  all of  the  required  revenue  from  a capital  tax, 
setting  the  labor tax to  zero: zX  =  g/co  and  Tz? =  0. The household's 
problem  is as in (6)-(7).  Since the labor tax is the same in both states, it 
follows  immediately  that consumption  is the same  in both  states: cx  = 
ci"  =  cmx.  The labor supplies  in the two states are then determined  by (8). 
In a world  with  a positive  (but small enough)  probability of a myopic 
government,  the Ramsey government  must alter its strategy, since other- 
wise  households  will not be willing  to invest. Conditional  on the myopic 
type  holding  office, the capital tax is Tm2  =  g/wc with  probability  1 -  t 
and zero otherwise.  Hence  a household  faces an expected  utility loss  of 
L  u'(cmx)  (1  )-  -  r  co  > 
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if it invests  its entire endowment.  The assumption  in (5) implies  that the 
term in braces is positive.  The Ramsey type must offset this loss by offer- 
ing an expected  gain when  it is in office. 
In particular, the Ramsey type must raise the subsidy  on capital in the 
low-spending  state and/or  cut the capital tax in the high-spending  state 
so that, averaging  over both types  of government,  the household  faces a 
nonnegative  expected  rate of return. Thus, in the mixed  economy  with 
probability  X of a myopic  government,  the rate-of-return constraint for 
the Ramsey government  is 
i  u'(c)(o(r 
- 
ri)  >  L  (10) 
i-/  11-k 
For X = 0 this inequality  reduces to the one in (9), but for k >  0 the right 
side  is positive  and increasing  in k. 
The problem  of the Ramsey  government  in the mixed  economy  is as 
before, with  (10) in place of (9). As shown  in Appendix  B, for any fixed 
k  >  0 the  solution  {0Rx,  (CRx  ,  Tki,  TRi),  i  =  1,  2}  retains  many  of the 
qualitative  features of the solution  for k =  0. Properties  (i)-(iii)  are un- 
changed:  consumption  and  the  labor tax  are the  same  across  the  two 
states, and labor supply  is higher by g in the second  state. The analogue 
of property (iv) says that (10) holds with equality. Property (v) continues 
to hold if k is not too large. In principle, however,  the Ramsey type might 
subsidize  capital in both states if k is large enough. 
Changes in the probability of a myopic administration affect the alloca- 
tion under  the Ramsey  government  as one would  expect: consumption 
cRx  is decreasing in k; the labor tax tx  is increasing in k; and both capital 
taxes Tz  are decreasing  in k. That is, the subsidy  on capital in the low- 
spending  state is larger, and the tax on capital in the high-spending  state 
is smaller. Expected utility,  conditional  on a Ramsey  government  being 
in office, is decreasing  in k. 
As X rises, the Ramsey government  must increase the distorting  labor 
tax to subsidize  capital more heavily when spending  is low and to finance 
a greater share of expenditure  when  spending  is high.  These  costs  are 
endured because  there is a substantial gain to maintaining  the incentives 
to invest. 
3.4 A POLICY  RULE 
Alternatively,  society  could  adopt a simple  policy  rule mandating  a cap 
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an incentive  to invest.  In our simple  model  the optimal  cap is  tk =  r/ 
(1 -  7i). Both the Ramsey  and myopic  types  use  the same policy  under 
the rule. In the low-spending  state tax rates are zero, T1l = Tzl =  0. In the 
high-spending  state  the  capital  tax  is  set  at the  mandated  maximum, 
Zk2 =  k, and the labor tax z'2 >  0 at the lowest  rate consistent with budget 
balance.  Expected  utility  under  this policy  rule is not  as high  as under 
the Ramsey policy, but the rule is robust against the blunders of the myo- 
pic government. 
3.5  AN  EXAMPLE 
In this section we will look at a simple numerical example that illustrates 
an important point: the difference in expected utility under the reputation 
equilibrium  compared  with  the policy  rule is quite modest,  even  if the 
government  is certain to be the Ramsey type. In addition, expected utility 
in the reputation  equilibrium  declines  as the probability  of the myopic 
type  rises, and eventually  the policy  rule dominates.By  contrast, the ex- 
pected utility gain from using  the rule rather than enduring  the one-shot 
Nash outcome is very substantial. This result reflects the fact that the rule 
was  deliberately  constructed  to exploit  a large potential  gain,  ignoring 
small ones. 
Utility  is logarithmic,  u(c) =  a In c, and the parameter values  are 
a =  10,  w =  1,  c  =  3,  r =  0.2,  g=  2,  7  =  1/2. 
The discount  factor P is assumed  to be sufficiently  close  to one  so that 
the reputation  equilibrium  exists. 
Figure 5a-d  displays  the equilibrium  outcomes  as the probability  of 
the myopic  type increases from 0% to 70%. Obviously,  nothing  happens 
to the policies  or outcomes  under  the myopic  type  or under  the policy 
rule. What do change  are the policies  adopted  by the Ramsey type  and 
the weighted  averages  in the economy  with  mixed  types. 
Figure 5a displays  the tax rates. Under  the myopic  type  the average 
capital tax rate is 33% (an average  of 67% and 0%), well  above  the 20% 
rate of return on capital. The labor tax is zero. Under  the Ramsey  type 
the average capital tax is 20% (an average of 51% and  -11%)  with X =  0 
and  declines  monotonically  as X rises. The labor tax is positive  and in- 
creases with X, offsetting the declining  revenues  from the capital tax. The 
reason for this pattern is clear: the Ramsey type adjusts its policy to main- 
tain the incentive for households  to invest. Under the policy rule the aver- 34 * STOKEY 
Figure 5 (a) TAX RATES; (b) CAPITAL-TAX REVENUE; (c) CONSUMPTION; 
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age  capital  tax  is 20% (an  average  of 40% and  0%), and  the  average  labor 
tax is a little over 5%. 
Figure 5b displays revenue from the capital tax. Recall that government 
expenditure  is 2 or 0. Under  the myopic  type  revenue  from the capital 
tax exactly covers spending:  it is 2 or 0, depending  on the state, and the 
labor tax is not used.  Under the Ramsey type, if k =  0 revenue  from the 
capital tax is 1.55 or -0.35,  depending  on the state. As  k increases, both 
figures decline (the subsidy  in the zero-spending  state gets larger). Under 
the  policy  rule  the  revenue  from  the  capital  tax  is  tkO0  =  rco/(l  -  )  = 
1.2 or 0, and the labor tax is used  when  spending  is high. 
Figure  5c  displays  consumption.  Consumption  is  the  same  in  both 
states under the myopic  or Ramsey types,  since each type sets the same 
labor tax in both states. Consumption  falls rather sharply under the Ram- 
sey  government  as  X rises.  This  change  is  a direct  consequence  of  the 
rising  labor tax. Under  the policy  rule  consumption  differs  in the  two 
states, since the labor tax varies. 
Figure 5d displays  expected utility under the myopic  and Ramsey gov- 
ernments, as well as the weighted  average, and under the policy rule. The 
rule delivers  higher expected  utility if k >  40%. 
The figures for the one-shot  Nash equilibrium  are not displayed,  since 
they are-literally-off  the charts. Households  do not invest,  so there is 
no  interest  income  and  all revenue  must  be  raised  from the labor tax. 
When g  =  0, labor supply  is 7 and consumption  is 10. When g  =  2, the 
labor tax is 40%, labor supply  is 5, and consumption  is 10. The expected 
utility is 14.5. This dismal outcome deters the Ramsey type from abandon- 
ing the reputation  equilibrium  for reasonable  P-values. 
This simple model illustrates several points. The first is quantitative. A 
policy rule that is simple but well designed  can capture much of the bene- 
fit available  from  commitment.  Here  the  first-order effect  comes  from 
maintaining the incentive to invest, as can be seen by comparing expected 
utility  under  the  Nash  regime  and  under  the  policy  rule.  The  simple 
rule cannot capture the further gains  available  from implicit  insurance, 
but these  are much  smaller. Indeed,  they vanish  altogether  if k is large 
enough. 
In addition,  the behavior  of  the  Ramsey  government  in  this  simple 
model suggests  that the political-economy  issues surrounding the reputa- 
tional equilibrium cannot be neglected.  Running for election on the Ram- 
sey platform in this economy  would  be a difficult task indeed! 
Finally, note that the damage  a "bad" government  can inflict is much 
larger if capital is long-lived.  To keep the model here simple, capital was 
assumed  to last for only one period.  If capital is durable and expensive, 
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4. Conclusion 
To conclude  it is useful to touch on some issues  that the two formal mod- 
els do not address.  We begin with  issues  related to the monetary model. 
As noted  above,  and as many  authors have  emphasized,  models  like 
the one analyzed here have a vast multiplicity  of equilibria. We compared 
monetary instruments by looking  at the best equilibrium within  a certain 
class. But why  should  we  suppose  that the best equilibrium  is likely  to 
arise? In addressing  this very  practical question,  it is useful  to keep  in 
mind  that many  of the equilibria  in these  games  have  similar outcome 
paths.  In particular, there are many  equilibria  in which  the bank plays 
the Ramsey  strategy as long  as its reputation  is intact. 
These  equilibria  differ  in  their description  of how  the bank loses  its 
reputation,  resulting  in a reversion  to a bad outcome,  and in the precise 
description of the nature of the reversion. Here we assumed  that one-shot 
Nash behavior prevailed during reversions and that the end of a reversion 
episode  was  linked to an observation  of the signal, but neither feature is 
critical. For example,  the most severe punishment  could be used  instead 
of one-shot Nash. And even if one-shot Nash is used, the reversions could 
be of fixed length, of completely  random length, allow returns to the good 
state as a complicated  function  of current and past signals,  etc. Indeed, 
the return probability could be interpreted as the (random) length of time 
required  to reorganize  the central bank or to install  a new  head  of the 
bank in office. As an empirical matter it would  be very difficult to distin- 
guish  sharply among  these  equilibria. They differ only  in their descrip- 
tions of reversion  behavior,  and reversions  are (necessarily)  rare. 
More importantly,  the model's  description  of behavior during a rever- 
sion episode  seems better taken with  several grains of salt. During good 
times  the central bank's behavior  is stable  and predictable.  This is also 
roughly true in practice, and the model  captures this behavior quite well. 
Reversions are not so precisely scripted, in reality or in the model. Choos- 
ing among reputation equilibria (on a theoretical level) and distinguishing 
among  them  (empirically)  are equally  difficult  tasks.  But they  are also 
unimportant  tasks, in the sense  that the important aspect of behavior  in 
the model  is the robust  feature  shared  by  all the reputation  equilibria, 
behavior  during  good  times. 
Having  argued that choosing  among  reputation equilibria is not terri- 
bly important, there remains the issue of how reputations are established. 
Formal models  that permit reputation equilibria always have a large mul- 
tiplicity of other equilibria as well.  Indeed, simply  repeating the bad out- 
come  is  one  possibility.  As  an  empirical  matter,  countries  with  stable 
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behavior in areas where it matters most: the public debt is honored; capi- 
tal taxes are stable and not too high; intellectual-property  rights are pro- 
tected  by  patents,  copyrights,  and  trademarks; and  monetary  policy  is 
fairly stable. Reputations are central in explaining  good  outcomes  in set- 
tings like these, where the policymaker has substantial discretion, but on 
a theoretical  level  little is understood  about  how  reputations  are built, 
how  credibility is established.1 
Since theory provides  little or no guidance here, it may be more fruitful 
to view  this as an empirical issue.  Perhaps this is the role of the central 
banker (an individual)  as opposed  to the central bank (an institution).  A 
successful central banker is one who can steer the economy toward a good 
equilibrium.  Success requires that the central bank take the appropriate 
actions, but that is not enough.  The central banker must convince  the pri- 
vate sector that the bank will behave  that way.  Indeed, he (or she) must 
persuade  the private sector that there is a commonly  held belief that the 
bank will behave appropriately. Perhaps "leadership" is the name we give 
to the elusive  qualities  that enable  some  individuals  to succeed  at this 
task. 
Initially establishing  a reputation for good behavior is a critical task for 
a central banker. Adopting  a more observable instrument for conducting 
policy,  pegging  an exchange  rate rather than using  the money  growth 
rate, may ease the banker's task during the critical initial phase when  he 
is attempting  to establish  a reputation for good  behavior.  Establishing  a 
currency board is another way  to accomplish  the same task, in the sense 
that it acts  as  an easy-to-monitor  instrument  for conducting  monetary 
policy.12 
Of course, in the long run monetary and fiscal policy are linked through 
the government's  budget  constraint. Good monetary policy  is simply  in- 
feasible without  a conservative  (balanced budget) fiscal policy. A govern- 
ment that runs substantial deficits, with no prospect of surpluses  to retire 
the accumulating  debt, will eventually  fail in its efforts to float new bond 
issues.  The problem  is exacerbated  if, as is typically  the case,  old  debt 
must be rolled over as well.  At some point  the only  feasible options  are 
outright default, a large devaluation,  or both. A government  facing that 
situation typically finds the seignorage  revenue from a large devaluation 
too attractive to resist, and monetary  policy becomes  the fiscal policy  of 
last resort.'3 
11. See Faust and Svensson  (2001) for an interesting  exception. 
12. Rogoff (1985) suggests  an intriguing  solution: simply  appointing  a central banker who 
places more weight  on price stability. 
13. See Zarazaga (1995) for a very interesting model in which episodic bouts of high inflation 
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The model  analyzed  here focuses  on an issue  that is critical for some 
central banks: those for which  establishing  and maintaining  a reputation 
is a first priority. After that task has been largely accomplished,  as it has 
been in the United States, in Japan, and elsewhere,  other issues take center 
stage: which  targets should  be used,  which  monetary  aggregates  should 
be given  the greatest attention, etc. These are important issues,  but only 
after a reputation for good  conduct  has been fairly well  established.  If a 
bridge is in danger of collapsing,  there is little point in repairing potholes. 
Only  after the  structural problems  have  been  addressed  is it useful  to 
think about the quality of the road surface. 
The model  of fiscal policy  analyzed  above illustrates one danger from 
allowing  too much discretion. The myopic  government  in the model  can 
be thought of as representing administrations subject to a variety of short- 
run political  pressures,  arising  from many  possible  sources.  The model 
highlights  the fact that a well-designed  policy rule is one that pays atten- 
tion to first-order effects  (here, the incentive  to invest),  although  it may 
neglect more subtle issues (here, the insurance available from a more sub- 
tle capital tax). 
The model  here  has  a representative  household,  but  the  same  issue 
arises when  there is heterogeneity.  Differences among households  create 
some  divergence  in views  about fiscal policy, but if those differences are 
modest,  there may still be a fair amount  of common  ground.  There may 
be a set of policy  rules that are advantageous  to all, even  if there is dis- 
agreement  about the optimum optimorum. 
The essence  of good  government  is to design  institutions  that permit 
solution  of the repeated  moral-hazard  problem.  The goal  of the models 
here has been to provide  some  insight  into that problem,  and how  it af- 
fects decisions  about policy  regimes. 
Appendix A 
The  set  of  simple  two-state  Markov  equilibria  for  the  money  growth 
model  is described  in detail  here.  First the incentive  compatibility  (IC) 
constraints for the central bank are derived. Then the equilibria that mini- 
mize  total expected  discounted  costs are characterized. 
Suppose  the economy  is in the good  state. Then households  expect the 
central bank to permit money  growth  (net of real output  growth)  at the 
Ramsey  rate,  g  =  ig =  0,  so  they  set  wages  at  wg =  0  +  o.  Households 
then observe  the signal s and the actual inflation rate n. Households  use 
a one-sided  threshold to decide if the bank has deviated.  If the signal lies 
below the threshold, s -  Sg,  they assume that the central bank has behaved 
as anticipated,  and the state next period is good.  Otherwise  they assume 40 *  STOKEY 
the central bank has deviated,  and the state next period is bad. In equilib- 
rium the central bank sets ,  =  gs =  0, so s  < Sg if and only if e?  Sg. 
When  the economy  is in the bad  state, households  expect  the central 
bank to set money growth at the Nash rate, ,u  =  ltb  _  RN,  so they set wages 
at Wb  =  RtN  +  a. They then observe s and n. Households  use a two-sided 
test in the bad  state, so the state next period  is good  if and only  if the 
signal lies within  the tolerance level set by the test, s e  [gN  _  b,  E  N  +  Eb]. 
Since the central bank sets money  growth at the Nash rate RN, the signal 
s lies in the acceptable region if and only if e E [-?b,  eb]. 
In a two-state  Markov equilibrium  the expected  discounted  value  of 
current and future losses from any period on depends  only on the current 
state. Let cg and Cb  denote  those expected  values,  and let 
A C= b -  Cg 
denote  the difference between  the two. 
Fix Sg _  0, and  suppose  that the  economy  is  in the  good  state.  The 
Ramsey rate of money  growth  gg  = 0 is incentive-compatible  for the cen- 
tral bank if and only  if any other growth  rate g ?  0 leads  to a (weakly) 
greater sum of current and future expected  losses.  If money  grows  at the 
rate g., then the expected  loss  in the current period  is A(0, p.). The state 
next period, and hence the payoffs  from next period on, depend  only on 
the signal s that is observed  today.  If money  grows  at the rate at p. and 
the signal s is observed,  the error term is E = s -  [.  Therefore, if Sg is the 
threshold  for the accept region, the expected  cost from next period on is 
cs  if ?  S8 -  , 
Cb  if  >  S  -  p. 
Hence the Ramsey growth rate pt  = 0 is incentive  compatible for the cen- 
tral bank in the good  state if and only if 
A(0, p) +  3{F(Sg  -  p)cg +  [1 -  F(S9 -  p)]cb} 
-  A(0,  0)  +  p {F(Sg -  0)cg +  [1  -  F(Sg  -  0)]cb},  all  p. 
Rearranging terms and using  the definition  of A, we  can write this con- 
straint as 
BA[F(Sg)  -  F(Sg -  p)]  A(0, 0) -  A(0, p) 
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The expression  on the left side of (11) is zero at Li =  0. Under Assump- 
tion 1 it is continuous  and increasing in g, convex for L <  Sg,  and concave 
for g >  Sg.  The expression  on the right side is also zero at r  = 0, and from 
(1) we  see  that it is increasing  for  ,i <  ba, decreasing  for  i  >  bca,  and 
everywhere  concave.  Hence  (11) holds  near ,t =  0 if and only  if 
PAf(Sg) -  ba.  (12) 
Condition  (12)  is  the  basic  IC constraint  that  equilibria  must  satisfy. 
The  interpretation  is  straightforward:  ba  is  the  marginal  gain  from 
increasing  the  expected  inflation  rate  in  the  current  period,  f(Sg)  is 
the  marginal  increase  in  the  probability  of  reversion  to  the  bad  state 
from that change,  and  PA is the discounted  expected  loss  if a reversion 
occurs. 
Similarly,  the Nash  rate of money  growth,  [b =  RN,  is incentive-compati- 
ble for the central bank in the bad state if and only  if any other growth 
rate g # gN leads to (weakly)  greater expected  losses.  Hence the required 
condition  is 
PA{[F(?)  -  F(-Lb)]  -  [F((gN -  i)  +  ?)  -  F((rN  -  L) -  b)]} 
> A(tN,  RtN) -  A(JN,  t),  all  ,g. 
Under Assumption  1 the left-hand  side is strictly positive  for all r  #  tIN, 
and it follows  immediately  from the definition  of RN that the right-hand 
side is negative  for all  I ? jLN.  Hence any value ?b  :  0 satisfies the incentive 
constraint for the bad state. 
For an  equilibrium  characterized  by  (Sg, ?b), the  probability  of  a re- 
version  to  the  bad  state  (along  the  equilibrium  outcome  path)  is  p  = 
1  -  F(Sg),  and  the  probability  of  a return  to the  good  state  is q =  F(eb) - 
F(-  ?b). Under  Assumption  1 the  relationship  between  the  thresholds 
(Sg,  Eb)  and the probabilities  (p, q) is invertible,  so we  can formulate the 
problem in terms of the latter. Thus, the next step is to solve for A in terms 
of the probabilities  (p, q). 
Suppose  (p, q) is an equilibrium pair. In equilibrium, the money growth 
rate in the good  state is 1tg  = 0, and the probability of an accidental rever- 
sion is p. Hence the expected discounted  value of current and future losses 
satisfies  the recursive relation 
cg =  A(0,  0)  +  p[cg +  pA].  (13) 42  STOKEY 
Similarly,  the  money  growth  rate  in  the  bad  state  is  b  =  IjN,  and  1  -  q 
is the probability of remaining  in the bad state. Hence  Cb satisfies the re- 
cursive  relation 
cb=  A(tN,  RN) +  P[Cg +  (1  -  q)A]. 
The difference between  the two  is 
A(p,  q)  = 
)  1  -  P(1  -  p  -  q) 
=  6v(p,  q),  (14) 
where  6  =  A(gN,  RN)  -  A(0,  0). 
Since f(Sg)  =  y(p), it then  follows  from  (12) that the  Ramsey  rate of 
money  growth  is incentive-compatible  in the good  state for any p, q E 
[0,1] satisfying 
y(p)p38y(p, q) >  ba.  (15) 
Since f  is symmetric,  so is y. Hence  if (15) holds  for  -  1/2,  it also holds 
for p =  1 -  p  1/2,  and we  can limit attention  to p-values  in the upper 
half of the distribution, p E (0,  /2]. 
Hence  if the density f(e)  satisfies  Assumption  1, there exists  a simple 
two-state  Markov equilibrium for any pair p e  (0,  /2] and q E [0, 1] satis- 
fying  (15). Since \x(p, q) is decreasing  in q, for fixed p, if (15) holds  any- 
where, it holds for q = 0, establishing  parts (a) and (b) of the proposition. 
Substituting  from (14) into (13), we  find that expected  cost per period 
in the (p, q) equilibrium  is 
(1 -  )cg(p, q) =  A(0, 0) +  3p8V(p, q). 
Hence expected  costs are minimized  if and only if (p, q) solves  (3), estab- 
lishing  part (c) of the proposition. 
Appendix  B 
Ramsey behavior for the tax model is characterized here. The cases k = 0 
and X >  0 are similar and can be treated together. 
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allocation  {(ci, ei),  i =  1, 2} and  the  capital  tax  rates  {(ki, i  =  1, 2}. To  this 
end, note  that the condition  for the consumer's  maximum  is 
(1  -  ei)wu'(c,)  -  1  0,  i  =  1, 2.  (16) 
Multiply the budget  constraint (7) by u'(Ci)  and substitute from (16) to get 
'(ci)[c  -  (1 +  r  -  tki)c]0  -  ti  =  0,  i =  1, 2.  (17) 
The constraints for the Ramsey government's  problem are (8), (9) or (10), 
and (17). Let ni[i,  o,  and 7nii be the multipliers  for the three constraints. 
Then the conditions  for a maximum  are 
0 =  ut + Xitu"  [ci -  (1 +  r - 
tki)0]  +  Ui}  -  i-  U(Io[Tki  r], 
0  =  -  1  -  xi +  [liW, 
0  =  (,i-  -)u'  o, 
i =  1, 2. The last two  equations  imply 
i =  and  i=1 
+ 
i=  1,2. 
w 
Then substituting  into the first equation  gives 
(1 +  )(Lu  --  +  +(ci  -  )u  =  O0,  i =  1,2, 
\  w] 
which suggests  a solution with the same private consumption  level in the 
two  states,  cl  =  C2 =  cR. The  remaining  task  is  to  find  values  for  (cR, {tf, 
Ti, i =  1, 2}) that satisfy  the constraints,  (8), (9) or (10), and (17). 
Use the market-clearing condition  (8) to write labor supply  in the two 
states as 
1R 
fe  =  [CR  -  (1 +  r)co + gi],  i =  1, 2.  (18) 
w 
Then use this fact and the budget  constraint (17) to obtain 
Ri.ioU'  =  (1  -  wu')R  +  giu',  i  =  1, 2.  (19) 
The rate of return constraint (9) or (10) holds  with  equality. 44  STOKEY 
Since consumption  is the same in the two states, the rate of return con- 
straint is 
u (cRx)  (r  R  Z  L 
Notice that since consumption  is different under the two types of govern- 
ment, expected  returns must be weighted  by marginal utilities as well  as 
probabilities. 
Hence 
(ou' ZriT  =  cour  -  L.  (20) 
i'  11-x 
Taking the probability-weighted  sum of the two equations in (19), substi- 
tuting from (20), and using  the fact that e2 =  fl  + g/w,  we  obtain 
rou'  -  A  =  (1 -  wu'  +  C2. 
w 
Using  (18), we  find that cR satisfies 
rou  -  A  -  u)  [cR  -  (1 +r)co]  +  2-. 
W\  w 
The labor supplies  tf,  t'  can then be  determined  from (18), the capital 
tax rates from (19), and the labor tax-which  is the same in both states- 
from (16). 
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Comment 
PETER N. IRELAND 
Boston  College and NBER 
1. Introduction 
In this paper,  Nancy  Stokey  presents  two  examples  in which  the time- 
consistency  problem  arises in a macroeconomic  policymaking  context. I 
consider these two examples  to be extremely well chosen, for several rea- 
sons.  First, each example  deals with  an important problem-the  choice 
of  a monetary  policy  instrument  or the  choice  of  a capital income  tax 
rate-that  is of considerable  interest in and of itself. Second, each serves 
to introduce us to some  powerful  analytic techniques  that recently have 
been developed  by researchers working  at the frontiers of economic  sci- 
ence.  The examples  show  us  how  far this branch of  the  literature has 
come, from a technical perspective,  in the twenty-five  years since the pub- 
lication of Kydland  and Prescott's (1977) original paper. 
But, third and perhaps most important of all, I consider these two exam- 
ples  to be  well  chosen  because  each  uses  a model  that shares its most 
basic features with  all of the other models  that have been  developed  in 
the literature that builds  on Kydland  and Prescott (1977). Thus, each of 
Nancy's  models  has  implications  for a wide  range  of  issues  that have 
already been studied  extensively,  and, by the same token, each remains 
silent on some important issues that have yet to be fully discussed,  much 
less  satisfactorily resolved,  in the literature as it stands now. 
In fact, because  Nancy's  models  are so  representative  of others from 
this branch of the literature, I will be able to use one of them here in my 
discussion  to provide  answers  of my own  to two more basic and funda- 
mental questions.  First, what have we learned about the time-consistency 
problem in the twenty-five  years since Kydland and Prescott (1977)? And 
second,  what  more might  we  hope  to learn about the problem  over the 
next twenty-five  years? 
2. The  Model 
My model  is a simplified  version  of one of Nancy's:  the model  that she 
uses  to  study  the  trade-off between  tightness  and  observability  in  the 
choice of a monetary policy instrument. My version of the model is simpli- 
fied in that it eliminates the random and unobservable  elements that play 
a key role in Nancy's  analysis, but are less essential for my purposes.  For 
the  most  part, I borrow  my  notation  directly  from  Nancy's  paper,  al- Comment 47 
though  I make a few  minor changes  here and there, when  they serve to 
make the results cleaner and easier to understand. 
My model  describes the behavior of a central bank, which  chooses  the 
rate of price inflation  t,  and a representative  household,  whose  actions 
determine the rate of wage inflation w. As explained  in more detail below, 
the representative  household  sets the rate of wage  inflation based on its 
expectations  of the central bank's choice of n. In this model, therefore, the 
variable w also serves  as a convenient  proxy  for expected  inflation. 
The central bank's objectives are summarized  by the single-period  re- 
turn or payoff  function 
R(7;; w)=-  2  2  +  2(W  - 
t  +  )2) 
where  the parameters  b and  a  are both  nonnegative.  The first term in 
this objective function  captures  the costs of inflation  or, more precisely, 
penalizes  deviations  of the inflation rate n from the central bank's target 
of zero. To interpret the second  term, consider  the expectational  Phillips 
curve 
U  =  U  -  (n  -  w), 
where  U denotes  the actual rate of unemployment,  where  U"  denotes  the 
natural  rate of  unemployment,  and  where,  since  w measures  expected 
inflation, nt -  w serves  as a measure  of surprise inflation. Then 
w -  n +  c  =  U -  (U" -  ), 
indicating that, according to the objective function R, the central bank sets 
a target  U" -  a  for the  unemployment  rate that lies  below the  natural 
rate. The parameter b measures  the weight  that the central bank places 
on achieving  this goal for unemployment,  relative to its goal for inflation. 
The representative household  in this model has a very simple objective: 
it wishes  to set w as close  as possible  to the central bank's  choice  of nt. 
The representative household  has rational expectations, which here in the 
absence  of shocks  translates into perfect foresight.  Thus, the household 
always  accomplishes  its goal by setting w exactly equal to n. 
This condition,  w =  i,  must always hold in equilibrium: it summarizes 
the implications  of the household's  optimizing  behavior.  What Kydland 
and Prescott's (1977) original paper teaches us is that macroeconomic  out- 
comes  depend  critically on whether  or not  the central bank  also views 48  IRELAND 
this equilibrium  condition  as a constraint that links its choice of n to the 
representative household's  choice of w. To see this, let's consider the two 
basic cases. 
CASE  1:  COMMITMENT  In this first case, the central bank has the willing- 
ness and the ability to precommit to a choice for n at the beginning  of the 
period,  before  the household  embeds  its  expectations  into  a particular 
choice of w. Since the central bank moves  first, it views  the equilibrium 
condition  w = n as a constraint that links its choice of n to a subsequent 
setting  for  w.  In this  case,  therefore,  the  central  bank  solves  the  con- 
strained optimization  problem 
max R(n; w)  subject to  w =  I. 
it 
The first-order condition  for this problem  implies  that the optimal  in- 
flation rate with  commitment,  denoted  by  Cc,  equals zero: 
tc =  0. 
When the central bank precommits  to a choice for xt,  it recognizes  that it 
is losing any ability it might otherwise have to surprise the representative 
household  and thereby exploit the Phillips curve. Hence, in this case with 
commitment,  the central bank abandons  any idea of pushing  unemploy- 
ment below  the natural rate, and instead focuses exclusively  on achieving 
its goal of zero inflation. 
CASE  2: NO COMMITMENT  In this second  case, the central bank is either 
unwilling  or unable to precommit,  and effectively  makes its choice  of n 
after the representative  household  has embedded  its expectations  into a 
particular choice of w. Since the central bank moves  second,  it no longer 
perceives  w = n as a constraint. Instead, the central bank simply  takes w 
as given,  and solves  the unconstrained  optimization  problem 
max R(n; w). 
The  first-order  condition  for  this  problem  dictates  that  the  central 
bank's optimal  choice without  commitment,  denoted  by  tnc, is given  by 
gnc =  (w  +  a). 
1 +b 
In equilibrium, however,  the condition w = n must still hold: in particular, 
the representative  household  perfectly  anticipates  the central bank's ac- Comment  *  49 
tions,  and  sets  w =  ntn.  Combining  this equilibrium  condition  with  the 
central bank's first-order condition  reveals that in this case without  com- 
mitment, 
1tnc  =  ba  0. 
Comparing  the outcomes  with  and without  commitment,  Tc =  0 and 
tnc  =  ba  - 0, serves  to crystalize  Kydland  and Prescott's (1977) original 
message.  The central bank that is either unwilling  or unable to precommit 
to a choice  of n finds itself tempted  to exploit  the expectational  Phillips 
curve,  in an effort to achieve  its goal  of pushing  unemployment  below 
the natural rate. The representative  household  has rational expectations, 
however,  and understands  that the central bank faces this temptation  to 
inflate. The household,  therefore, builds  these  inflationary  expectations 
into its wage-setting  decisions,  so that unemployment  remains at its natu- 
ral rate. The central bank's efforts to exploit  the Phillips curve lead only 
to a suboptimally  high  rate of inflation. 
3.  What  Have We  Learned  since  Kydland  and Prescott 
(1977)? 
But what else have we learned about the time-consistency  problem in the 
twenty-five  years since the publication  of Kydland  and Prescott's (1977) 
original paper? Comparing the outcomes  7tc = 0 and 7nc  = ba immediately 
reveals that in this simple version of Nancy's model, ba conveniently  mea- 
sures  the inflationary  bias  that results  when  the central bank  does  not 
precommit to its choice for 7. This expression,  ba, also suggests  that there 
are at least two  promising  strategies  that policymakers  can use to mini- 
mize  the inflationary bias, and thereby improve  welfare. 
One possibility  involves  setting  the parameter o equal to zero, that is, 
instructing the central bank to stop targeting an unemployment  rate that 
lies below  the natural rate. McCallum (1995) argues passionately  in favor 
of  this  solution  to  the  central  bank's  time-consistency  problem,  and 
Blinder  (1997) suggests  that in  practice,  Federal  Reserve  officials  have 
acted to minimize  the importance of the time-consistency  problem by be- 
having  as if a  =  0. In fact, when  ac =  0 in the simple  model  considered 
here, the time-consistency  problem vanishes: outcomes  with and without 
commitment  coincide. 
A second possibility  involves  setting the parameter b equal to zero, that 
is, instructing  the central bank to stop caring so much  about unemploy- 
ment  in  the  first place.  This proposed  solution  to the  time-consistency 50  IRELAND 
problem  corresponds,  of course,  to Rogoff's  (1985) suggestion  that the 
appointment  of a conservative  central banker can lead to preferred out- 
comes in cases where monetary precommitment  is impossible.  And again, 
in the context of this simple model,  outcomes  with and without  commit- 
ment coincide  when  b =  0. 
Much  of  the  recent literature that builds  on  Kydland  and  Prescott's 
(1977) original study  focuses  on the choice between  these  two  solutions 
to  the  time-consistency  problem  for monetary  policymaking.  As  noted 
above,  both  solutions  work  perfectly  well  in  the context  of the  simple 
nonstochastic  model  used  here. However,  in more complicated  models 
where  random  shocks  give  rise to a trade-off between  the variability as 
well as the levels of inflation on one hand and unemployment  on the other, 
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999), Herrendorf and Lockwood  (1997), and 
Svensson  (1997) find  that in  addition  to the  inflationary bias that arises 
here, a stabilization bias also emerges  in the absence of commitment:  the 
discretionary central bank works too hard to stabilize unemployment,  and 
not hard enough  to stabilize inflation, in response  to the shocks that hit 
the economy. 
All three of these recent papers demonstrate that while the inflationary 
bias vanishes  when  a  = 0, so that the central bank's target for unemploy- 
ment  coincides  with  the natural rate, the stabilization  bias remains. All 
three of these papers also suggest  that the alternative solution of appoint- 
ing  a conservative  central banker, with  a lower  value  of b, can work  to 
minimize  both the inflationary bias and the stabilization bias, especially 
in cases where the conservative  central banker is also offered an inflation 
contract of the kind  first proposed  by  Walsh  (1995). This, in my  view, 
represents  one  of  the  most  important  lessons  to have  come  out  of  the 
literature that builds  on Kydland  and  Prescott (1977): that in situations 
where the time-consistency  problem arises, it can be desirable to appoint 
policymakers  whose  preferences or incentives  differ systematically  from 
those  of society  as a whole. 
In the  U.S.  economy,  therefore,  consider  Federal  Reserve  Chairmen 
Volker and Greenspan, both of whom  might reasonably be described as 
conservative  in the Rogoffian  sense  of caring more about inflation,  and 
less  about  unemployment,  than  the  average  American  consumer  or 
worker. It is certainly legitimate  to ask whether,  in a representative  de- 
mocracy  like ours,  it is really appropriate  to give  men  like Volker and 
Greenspan power  over such an important component  of macroeconomic 
policy.  The literature that builds  on Kydland  and Prescott (1977), how- 
ever, provides  us with  a compelling  response  to this concern, by  dem- 
onstrating  that  in  situations  like  monetary  policymaking,  where  the 
time-consistency  problem may arise, it makes sense to appoint conserva- Comment  .  51 
tive  central bankers-even  when  the  ultimate  goal  is  to  maximize  the 
welfare  of the economy's  representative  household. 
4.  What More Can We Learn? 
And what additional lessons might we hope to lear  over the next twenty- 
five years? As a first step in answering  this question,  consider following 
Barro and  Gordon  (1983) and  Ireland  (1997) in  allowing  the  monetary 
policymaking  game described above to be repeated over an infinite hori- 
zon,  where  time  periods  are  indexed  by  t  =  0,  1, 2,  ....  Suppose,  as  in 
Case 2 above,  that the central bank does  not precommit  to its choice for 
inflation; but suppose,  also, that the behavior of the representative house- 
hold's  expectations  provides  the central bank with  an incentive  to main- 
tain a reputation  for keeping  inflation low. 
More specifically,  suppose  that at the beginning  of period  t =  0, the 
representative  household  expects  the central bank to choose  an inflation 
rate  70 =  nrep  for  that  period,  where  trep  lies  somewhere  between  TIc  =  0 
and  tnc  =  bc.  Suppose,  in  addition,  that  in  each  period  t  =  1, 2,  3,  ..., 
the household  continues  to expect the central bank to choose  -t  =  rep so 
long  as it has always  done  so in the past.  If, however,  the central bank 
deviates  during  some  period  t  =  0,  1, 2,  ..  .,  by  choosing  an  inflation 
rate  7t  that differs  from  Crepz  then  the household's  expectations  perma- 
nently  shift,  so that the no-commitment  choice  7inc  =  bo is expected  forever 
after. Given  the household's  objective of setting  w in line with  expected 
inflation, these  assumptions  imply  that for t =  0, Wo =  trep,  while  for all 
t  =  1, 2,3,..  ., 
n;rep  if 7,  =  nrep for  all  s  =  0,  1, ...,  t  -  1, 
Wt  =  ~ 
7nc  =  boc,  otherwise. 
The question now becomes: given this behavior of private-sector expecta- 
tions, will  the central bank choose  to maintain its reputation for selecting 
the  lower  inflation  rate  treP? 
In the  case  where  the  central bank  does  maintain  its  reputation  by 
choosing  itt =  trep  for  all  t  =  0,  1, 2,  . ..,  its  total  discounted  return  over 
the infinite horizon  is given  by 
1  R(ireP;  ntrep), 
where  3,  the central bank's discount  factor, lies between  zero and one. In 
the alternative  case, where  the central bank deviates,  it will  always  find 52  IRELAND 
it optimal  to do so immediately,  during period  t =  0, by choosing  0o  to 
solve  the problem 
maxR(7i;  trep). 
7t 
Hence,  in this case, the central bank chooses  i0  =  tdev,  where 
dev  =  (rep  +  a) 
1  +b 
During each period thereafter, having lost its reputation, the best that the 
central bank can do is to select nt =-  cnc =  ba for all t =  1, 2, 3,  ....  Its 
total discounted  return from deviating  is therefore 
R(idev;  trep)  +  R(ignc;  Xnc). 
1-P 
It follows  that the policy choice it  =  rep  for all t = 0, 1, 2,...  is sustain- 
able in this type  of reputational equilibrium  if and only if the incentive- 
compatibility  constraint 
R(itrep;  ntrep)  >  (1 
- 
P)R(itdev;  nrep)  +  R(iCnc;  itnc) 
holds.  Using  the solutions  n7dev =  [b/(l  +  b)](irep +  a)  and  nc  =i  ba,  this 
incentive  constraint can be rewritten as 
[P(2  +  b)  -  l](ba)2  +  2(1  -  P)baxtreP  -  (b  +  1)(irep)2 l  0. 
This last expression  indicates that the zero-inflation policy that is optimal 
under commitment can be supported in a reputational equilibrium when- 
ever  P  -  1/(2  +  b). And  since  b is nonnegative,  this  condition  almost 
certainly holds: it is satisfied for any value of P  exceeding  1/2.  Here, there- 
fore, we  have  another lesson  to have  emerged  from the literature since 
Kydland  and  Prescott  (1977): a central bank that is sufficiently  patient, 
and that is lucky  enough  to be endowed  with  a reputation  for keeping 
inflation low, will find it optimal to maintain its reputation even if it lacks 
the ability to commit. 
One can also show,  however,  that if p  -  1/(2  +  b), so that the central 
bank's  incentive  constraint holds  with  nrep =  0, then  the incentive  con- 
straint also holds for any value of nrep  between  ic = 0 and ntn =  ba. In this 
case, therefore, the model  features multiple  equilibria, supporting  infla- Comment 53 
tion  rates that range  all the way  from zero  to  ba. To see  why  this is a 
problem, consider a reputational equilibrium in which  nrep  lies below  "nc  = 
ba, but closer to tnc"  = ba than to  tc = 0. In such an equilibrium, the central 
bank benefits from maintaining its reputation: it achieves an outcome that 
improves  upon  the endless  repetition  of the one-shot  outcome  without 
commitment.  At  the  same  time,  however,  the central bank knows  that 
even better equilibria exist, with even lower inflation rates. Yet the model 
provides  absolutely  no advice as to how  the central bank might steer the 
economy  towards  these preferred, low-inflation  equilibria. 
Taylor (1982) suggests  that a central bank ought to build credibility for 
a low-inflation  policy by adopting  that policy unilaterally and by demon- 
strating that it will stick with the policy, even if it imposes  short-run costs 
on the economy.  Taylor's pragmatic approach has considerable  intuitive 
appeal,  and may  be a good  strategy  for any real-world  central bank to 
follow.  But it simply  will not work in the context of the example  consid- 
ered  here.  In fact, the  triggerlike  behavior  of  the representative  house- 
hold's  expectations  that help support the reputational equilibria with  ntrep 
<  7rnc =  ba  dictates  that expected  inflation will  actually jump higher, to 
7nc =  ba,  should the central bank deviate from 1rep by unexpectedly  trying 
to disinflate. 
How  can a central bank establish a reputation for fighting inflation, or 
build credibility for a welfare-improving  disinflationary program? In the 
literature that  follows  Kydland  and  Prescott  (1977), work  towards  an- 
swering  this  question  has  only  just begun.  Significantly,  providing  an- 
swers to this question would  seem to require departing in some way from 
the rational-expectations  hypothesis,  since, after all, the reputational equi- 
libria in which  inflation  is  stuck  forever  between  7c =  0 and  2tnc =  ba 
are bona fide rational-expectations  equilibria. Cho and Matsui (1995) and 
Ireland (2000), for instance, both develop  models  of macroeconomic  poli- 
cymaking  in which private agents are assumed  to be boundedly  rational. 
The objective of both of these papers is to identify restrictions on private- 
expectation formation that are weak enough to allow Taylor's (1982) prag- 
matic approach to work, but strong enough  to prevent  the policymaker 
from repeatedly  fooling  the boundedly  rational agents. Still, much more 
work  needs  to be  done  along  these  lines: we  have  much  to learn, over 
the next twenty-five  years, about how  governments  can build credibility 
for the policies-like  low inflation and low capital income tax rates-that 
we'd  like them to pursue. 
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Commentl 
LARS  E. O. SVENSSON 
Princeton  University,  NBER,  and  CEPR 
Nancy  Stokey's  interesting  and thought-provoking  paper has two  main 
parts. Section 2, "Reputation Building," discusses  the choice of monetary- 
policy  instruments by relying on Atkeson and Kehoe (2001). This discus- 
sion is in terms of a trade-off between  observability  and "tightness" (the 
correlation with  the monetary-policy  goal). Section 3, "Robustness," dis- 
cusses  the choice between  discretion  and commitment  to a simple  rule. 
This discussion  is in terms of a trade-off between  flexibility and myopia 
on the one hand and rigidity  and farsightedness  on the other. 
I believe  Section 2 is better described  as concerned with  the choice of 
an intermediate  target for monetary  policy  rather than a monetary-policy 
instrument. The setting of the monetary-policy  instrument (the Fed funds 
rate in the United States) is usually  directly observable, whereas the rela- 
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tion between the instrument setting and the monetary-policy  goals is com- 
plex,  making  it difficult  to  infer  the  central bank's  intentions  from  its 
instrument  setting. Thus, I interpret Section 2 as a discussion  of the pros 
and cons  of either an exchange-rate  target or a money-growth  target as 
intermediate  targets, when  the final target (the goal) is inflation. 
The choice of an intermediate  target is a classic problem in the design 
of monetary  policy.  An ideal intermediate  target is (1) highly  correlated 
with the goal, (2) easier to control than the goal, and (3) easier to observe 
than the goal. The idea is that, if such an ideal intermediate target can be 
found,  it may be better to aim for the intermediate  target rather than to 
aim directly for the goal, and this way  indirectly  achieve  the goal. 
In current real-world  monetary  policy,  the  idea  of  intermediate  tar- 
geting  has largely been abandoned  (except in a specific sense mentioned 
below). Instead, central banks nowadays  aim directly for their goals, typi- 
cally low inflation and (to some extent) stable output gaps, as in (flexible) 
inflation targeting. The main problem with  inflation targeting is that the 
control of inflation (and the output gap) is very imperfect, due to the lags 
in,  and  different  strengths  of, the  various  channels  in the transmission 
process from instrument adjustments to actual inflation and output. This 
makes  it difficult to judge  whether  current policy  settings  are, and past 
policy  settings  were, appropriate. The best solution  to this problem  is to 
regard inflation and output-gap  forecasts as intermediate  targets. 
Indeed,  as discussed  in Svensson  (1997a), the inflation  forecast  is an 
ideal  intermediate  target variable when  inflation is the final target vari- 
able. The inflation  forecast is by definition  the current variable that has 
the highest  correlation with  future inflation.  It is easier to control than 
actual inflation, for instance, because  it leaves  out a number of unantici- 
pated shocks that will  later affect actual inflation. It is in principle easier 
to observe  than actual inflation, since it is a variable currently available, 
whereas  the corresponding  actual inflation  will  only  be observed  some 
two years later (due to the lags) and then be contaminated  by a number 
of intervening shocks. In particular, transparent inflation-targeting central 
banks make  their inflation forecasts observable, by issuing  detailed  infla- 
tion reports where  the forecast is presented  and motivated.  (Thus, argu- 
ably, the only  ideal intermediate  target variables are the forecasts of the 
final target variables.) 
Section 3, "Robustness," discusses  the trade-off between  flexibility and 
an inflation  bias on  the one hand  and rigidity  and no  inflation bias  on 
the other. This is a well-known  and classic issue. For instance, the purpose 
of a fixed exchange rate or a currency board in a country may be to avoid 
inflation  bias by  importing  a less  inflationary  monetary  policy  from an 
anchor country. But this is a second-best  solution,  since monetary policy 56  SVENSSON 
can then no  longer  be  independent  and  respond  to the  specific  shocks 
hitting the country. 
In real-world  monetary  policy,  however,  it  seems  possible  in  many 
cases to get rid of any inflation bias without losing flexibility and stabiliza- 
tion. In order to discuss  this, let us go back to the classic treatments in 
Kydland  and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon  (1983a) of rules vs. 
discretion  and  the  time-consistency  problem.  Although  these  issues  in 
principle  apply  to a number  of different policies,  monetary  policy  pro- 
vides  the best examples,  having  arguably suffered  the largest problems 
and benefited  the most from their solutions. 
The main result in the classic treatment was  that discretion may result 
in an average  inflation bias. The simplest  way  to illustrate this result is 
with  the help of a simple  Lucas-type Phillips  curve, 
yt  =  y  +  ca(It  -  Et,-_lt)  +  Et, 
where  yt is output  in period  t, y is potential  output  (the natural output 
level),  a  is  a positive  coefficient,  Kt is inflation  in period  t, Et- 1  t denotes 
rational expectations  of inflation  in period  t conditional  on information 
available  in period  t -  1, and E?  is a zero-mean  i.i.d. shock. The central 
bank is assumed  to control either inflation or output, and has a quadratic 
loss function, 
Lt =  (t,  -  7*)2 +  (yt  -  y 
- 
k)2, 
where  n* is an inflation target, X is a positive  weight,  and k is a positive 
parameter. This formulation implies that the output target, y + k, is larger 
than  potential  output,  y. 
Discretionary  optimization  of the central bank implies  the first-order 
condition 
tot -  K* +  xa(y, 
- 
y  -  k)  =  0. 
Combining  this  condition  and  the Phillips  curve  gives  the  equilibrium 
outcome  for inflation and output, 
iRt  =  *  +  Xak  -  X1  ?t 
1  +  X 
yt =/  +  1 +  Xa2Et' 
In particular, there is an average inflation bias, in that the unconditional 
mean of inflation exceeds  the inflation target: Comment  - 57 
E[nt] -  C*  =  kak >  0. 
Numerous  solutions  to the problem of average inflation bias under dis- 
cretion have been suggested.  One solution is a commitment  to an optimal 
reaction function. In the absence of a commitment  mechanism,  this solu- 
tion  is not  realistic.  In particular, in  any  realistic problem,  the  optimal 
reaction function is quite complex  and in practice unverifiable, making a 
commitment  to it very  difficult or impossible. 
Another solution  is by extension  to non-Markov  trigger-strategy equi- 
libria, following  Barro and Gordon (1983b). These have the inherent prob- 
lem that follows  from the folk theorem: there is no unique  equilibrium. 
Furthermore, in  the  realistic  situation  with  an atomistic  private  sector, 
there is no  coordination  mechanism  by  which  a particular equilibrium 
could  be  achieved.2 In addition,  these  equilibria  are sometimes  (and in 
Stokey's paper) referred to as having to do with "reputation." I think that 
is a (very common)  misnomer.  There is no uncertainty about the charac- 
teristics of the players in these settings. I think "reputation" is much more 
naturally associated with a situation of incomplete  information, when the 
preferences  of the central bank are not directly observable,  as is the case 
in classic papers by Backus and Driffill (1985) and Cukierman and Meltzer 
(1986), and  in the recent extension  of the latter by  Faust and  Svensson 
(2001). In these papers,  "reputation" is the private sector's best estimate 
of the preferences  of the central bank. 
A much-noted  suggestion  is McCallum's  (1995) "just do  it." This as- 
sumes  that the central bank, in the absence of a commitment  mechanism, 
just ignores  the incentives  to deviate  from the socially  optimal  outcome 
that arises under  discretion.  I find this suggestion  problematic  because, 
to  my  knowledge,  neither  McCallum  nor  anyone  else  has  presented  a 
model  where  "just do it" is an equilibrium  outcome.  The best rationale 
for "just do it" that I am aware of is in Faust and Svensson  (2001): There, 
increased transparency about the bank's actions makes the bank's "repu- 
tation" (the private sector's estimate  of the bank's unobservable  internal 
time-varying  objectives) more sensitive  to its actions. This increases  the 
cost  for the bank  of deviating  from its  announced  social  objective  and 
pursuing its internal objectives, and thus works as an implicit mechanism 
for commitment  to the announced  objective. 
Many papers have fruitfully applied  a principal-agent  approach to the 
time-consistency  problem.  Here  society  (the  principal)  can  assign  loss 
functions  to the central bank  (the agent)  that may  differ from society's 
2. Problems with trigger-strategy equilibria are further discussed  in Ireland's comment pre- 
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loss  function,  in  order  to improve  the  discretionary  problem.3 That is, 
it is assumed  that it is possible  to commit  the central bank to a partic- 
ular loss function, whereas  the minimization  of that loss function occurs 
under  discretion.  A well-known  suggestion  is Rogoff's  (1985) "weight- 
conservative"  central bank, where  the central bank is assigned  a relative 
weight  X on output  stabilization  that is less than that of society.  This re- 
duces average inflation and inflation variance, but increases output vari- 
ance. This is often  described  as a necessary  trade-off between  inflation 
bias and "flexibility." However,  this potential explanation of low inflation 
in some  countries  is rejected by the data: Countries with  lower  average 
inflation do not have higher output  variability. 
Another suggestion  is an "inflation contract," by Walsh (1995) and Pers- 
son  and  Tabellini  (1994), further discussed  in Svensson  (1997b), where 
lower  inflation is assumed  to be accompanied  by an increased bonus  to 
the central bank or its governor. This idea has never been tried in the real 
world  (not even  in New  Zealand, counter to common  misperceptions). 
A third suggestion  is an "output-conservative"  central bank, meaning 
a loss  function  for the central bank where  the output  target is equal  to 
potential output, k = 0. This eliminates the average inflation bias without 
increasing  output  variability and is hence  consistent  with  the data. This 
explanation has been suggested  by Blinder (1998) for the Fed. I believe this 
is the best single  explanation  for the apparent disappearance  of average 
inflation bias in many countries. Indeed, I believe that the flexible inflation 
targeting currently applied in an increasing number of countries is consis- 
tent with  central-bank loss functions where there is some modest  weight 
on  output-gap  stability  and  the  output  target equals  potential  output. 
Thus, this solution  to the inflation-bias problem need not imply any loss 
in flexibility. It is consistent  with  the insight  that society  had better find 
other policies than monetary policy (such as structural policies improving 
competition)  to increase average and potential  output.4 
Issues  of commitment  and  discretion  have  been  discussed  in a more 
general linear-quadratic  model in early papers of Oudiz and Sachs (1985), 
Currie and  Levine  [collected  in Currie and  Levine  (1993)], and  Backus 
and Driffill (1986), with  the model  equations 
Xt+,  Xt  ?E  +1 
= A  +  Bit + 
EtXt+l  _Xt  ? 
3. The possibility  of improving  the discretionary  equilibrium by adjusting the parameters 
of the central-bank loss  function was  noted  in Barro and Gordon (1983a, footnote  19). 
4. Ireland, in his  comment,  interprets, McCallum's  "just do  it" as modifying  the central- 
bank loss  function by setting  k =  0, but I can't find any support  for that interpretation 
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Here, Xt is a vector of predetermined  variables (one of these can be unity, 
in  order  to  handle  constants  in  a  convenient  way),  xt is  as  vector  of 
forward-looking  variables (jump variables, nonpredetermined  variables), 
it is a vector of policy instruments, ?t is a vector of zero-mean i.i.d. shocks, 
and A and B are matrices of appropriate  dimension.  The policymaker's 
intertemporal  loss  function  in period  t is 
00 
E,(1 =  8)  1  8Lt,T, 
=0 
where  8, 0 <  8 <  1, is a discount  factor, and the period  loss  function  Lt 
is quadratic: 
Lt =  (Yt -  Y)'W(Y,  -  Y). 
Here  W is a positive  semidefinite  weight  matrix, Yt is a vector of target 
variables, and Y is a vector of corresponding  target levels,  which  can be 
written 
-Xt- 
Yt-  Y=  C  Xt, 
_t  J 
where  C is a matrix. 
The optimal  reaction function  under commitment  (the optimal  "instru- 
ment rule") can be written 
it  =  FXt +  (  t-1, 
where F and  D are matrices and Et is a vector of Lagrange multipliers for 
the equations  for the forward-looking  variables  (the lower  block of the 
model  equations above), the equilibrium dynamics  of which are given by 
-t  =  SXt  +  E-t-l, 
where  S and I  are matrices. 
The equilibrium  reaction function  resulting  from optimization  under 
discretion can be written 
it =  FXt, 60 *  SVENSSON 
where  F is a matrix. Compared  to the optimal  reaction function  under 
commitment,  there is generally stabilization  bias [meaning that the matrix 
of response  coefficients  F under  discretion  differs  from the optimal  re- 
sponse  F under  commitment,  as discussed  in Svensson  (1997b), for in- 
stance] and  lack of history dependence  [(  =  0, as discussed  in Woodford 
(1999)]. Optimization  under  discretion thus results in a higher loss than 
under commitment. 
Several solutions to the problem of how to improve the equilibrium under 
discretion have been suggested  for this more general setting. One solution 
is a commitment to the optimal reaction function above. Unfortunately, in 
realistic problems the optimal reaction function is quite complex, making 
verification and other aspects of a commitment mechanism unrealistic. 
A commitment  to a simple (rather than optimal)  instrument  rule, such 
as a Taylor rule, has been  suggested  as a compromise.  A simple  instru- 
ment  rule could  be verifiable, and a commitment  would  in principle be 
feasible. No central bank has committed to a simple instrument rule, how- 
ever, and prominent  central bankers seem skeptical [see Svensson  (2002) 
for further discussion]. 
One solution  is a commitment  to continuity and predictability,  suggested 
by Svensson  and Woodford  (2002), who  argue that such a commitment 
is  to some  extent  consistent  with  both  the  rhetoric and  the practice  of 
current inflation targeting. It consists in internalizing the cost of deviating 
from previous  expectations,  and boils  down  to  a modified  period  loss 
function of the form 
L, =  (Y  -  Y)'W(Y, -  Y) +  St-l(x  -  Et-x,t), 
where  -t-1  is the vector of Lagrange multipliers  from the previous  deci- 
sion period. 
Another solution is a commitment to an optimal  targeting  rule, discussed 
in Svensson  and Woodford  (2002) and Svensson  (2002), and consistent 
with  previous  work  of  Sims  (1980), Rogoff  (1985), Walsh  (1995), and 
Svensson  (1997a). An optimal targeting rule is an Euler condition, an opti- 
mal first-order condition for the target variables-essentially,  the equality 
of the marginal rate of transformation between  the target variables (given 
by the model equations) and the corresponding  marginal rate of substitu- 
tion (given by the loss function). One attraction of optimal targeting rules 
is that they are usually  much simpler and more robust than the optimal 
reaction function,  making  a commitment  to them more realistic. For in- 
stance, all additive shocks to the model equations vanish from the optimal 
targeting rule (but not from the optimal reaction function). In the simple 
Kydland-Prescott-Barro-Gordon  model  above,  the  optimal  targeting 
rule is Comment  * 61 
t-, -  7*  +  Xa(yt  -  y)  =  0. 
With lags in the transmission mechanism  of monetary policy, the optimal 
targeting rule involves  forecasts of the target variables rather than current 
values. 
Another  alternative  is a commitment  to a simple targeting rule, for in- 
stance, the simple rule emphasized  by the Bank of England and Sweden's 
Riksbank that the  two-year-ahead  inflation  forecast should  be  equal  to 
the inflation target. 
So what  have  we  learnt about  rules  and  discretion  after twenty-five 
years? I believe  the most important things we  have  learnt are: 
The problem  of average  inflation bias seems  to be gone.  The single  best 
explanation  for its disappearance  is probably output-conservativeness  of 
central banks-that  is, central banks, in addition  to an explicit  or im- 
plicit inflation target, have an explicit or implicit output target equal to 
(rather than exceeding)  potential output. This also means that average 
inflation bias can be avoided  without  loss in flexibility or stabilization 
of the output  gap. 
Even if no average inflation bias occurs, discretion generally implies stabi- 
lization bias and lack of history dependence  (although the quantitative 
importance of these two phenomena  remains to be firmly established). 
A principal-agent  approach to central banking is useful. Commitment  to 
objectives (loss functions)  is probably more realistic and relevant than 
commitment  to particular reaction functions  (instrument rules). 
Targeting rules may be more useful  and realistic than instrument  rules. 
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Discussion 
A theme taken up by several of the participants was the different possible 
interpretations  of  U.S.  inflation  history  in  the  1970s  and  1990s.  Greg 
Mankiw suggested  as an alternative to Lars Svensson's  interpretation that 
central bankers in the 1970s thought that the natural level  of output was 
higher than it actually was, whereas in the 1990s, central bankers thought 
that the natural level of output was lower than it actually was. He added 
that such  an alternative  interpretation  would  be  bad  for the  rules-vs.- 
discretion  literature. It would  imply  that monetary  policy  in the  1990s 
was better than 30 years ago not because monetary policy was less discre- 
tionary in the 1990s than in the 1970s, but because  central bankers were 
lucky in the shocks that hit the economy. 
Robert Barsky proposed  a  variation  on  Mankiw's  comment.  Where 
Mankiw emphasized  the importance of the Fed knowing  or not knowing 
what was the natural level of output, Barsky suggested  that an alternative 
explanation  for recent U.S. inflation history  is that the Fed learned  the 
natural-rate hypothesis  over time. 
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Discussion 
A theme taken up by several of the participants was the different possible 
interpretations  of  U.S.  inflation  history  in  the  1970s  and  1990s.  Greg 
Mankiw suggested  as an alternative to Lars Svensson's  interpretation that 
central bankers in the 1970s thought that the natural level  of output was 
higher than it actually was, whereas in the 1990s, central bankers thought 
that the natural level of output was lower than it actually was. He added 
that such  an alternative  interpretation  would  be  bad  for the  rules-vs.- 
discretion  literature. It would  imply  that monetary  policy  in the  1990s 
was better than 30 years ago not because monetary policy was less discre- 
tionary in the 1990s than in the 1970s, but because  central bankers were 
lucky in the shocks that hit the economy. 
Robert Barsky proposed  a  variation  on  Mankiw's  comment.  Where 
Mankiw emphasized  the importance of the Fed knowing  or not knowing 
what was the natural level of output, Barsky suggested  that an alternative 
explanation  for recent U.S. inflation history  is that the Fed learned  the 
natural-rate hypothesis  over time. Discussion  ?  63 
Bob Hall  commented  that when  Alan  Greenspan  was  asked  why  he 
tolerated  unemployment  below  the natural rate in the 1990s, he replied 
that he had focused  not on unemployment  but on what was  happening 
to prices. Hall's interpretation of this reply was that Greenspan's success 
relative  to the central bankers of the 1970s can be attributed to a policy 
of price targeting, and not merely to good luck. Hall also maintained that, 
contrary to the teaching  of Milton  Friedman, the idea  of an exogenous 
natural rate of unemployment  is not a sensible  one. On this point, Greg 
Mankiw responded  that Friedman's idea was merely that the natural rate 
of unemployment  was  exogenous  to monetary  policy.  Hall replied  that 
there is strong evidence  of hysteresis in the labor market and of monetary 
policy affecting the labor market, and hence exogeneity  of the natural rate 
of unemployment  to monetary  policy  is unlikely.  Greg Mankiw  desired 
clarification on the empirical evidence.  He did not dispute that the natural 
rate of unemployment  changes over time, but questioned  Hall's certainty 
that monetary  policy  can affect the long-run  level  of unemployment. 
Robert Barro suggested  that Hall's interpretation of Alan Greenspan's 
approach  is not accurate empirically,  as there is clear evidence  that the 
federal funds rate responds  not only to inflation, but also to employment 
and other macroeconomic  variables. 
On the discussion  of the natural-rate hypothesis,  Lars Svensson  main- 
tained  that potential  output  is a very useful  concept both in theory and 
in practice. He allowed  that, as it is an unobservable variable, the Fed can 
make mistakes  in estimating  it. His view,  however,  was  that if the Fed 
had looked  at Kalman-filter estimates  of potential  output  in the 1970s, it 
would  have  realized  that rising inflation meant  a reduction  in potential 
output. 
Alberto Alesina  contributed  to the discussion  on U.S. inflation history 
by saying  that in looking  for empirical evidence  for or against the rules- 
vs.-discretion  literature,  it might  be  useful  to  look  beyond  the  United 
States to the experience  of other countries. 
Alesina raised another issue of interest to several participants. He sup- 
ported  Stokey's  view  of reputation  over that of the discussants.  As evi- 
dence  for the relevance  of reputation in the real world,  he cited the fact 
that major breakdowns  in  monetary  rules  and  government  default  on 
debt are relatively rare in the developed  world. He said this confirms the 
view  that governments  desire to maintain a reputation for repayment  in 
order to be able to borrow again. He was  of the opinion  that multiplicity 
of reputational  equilibria is not a crucial problem  in the real world.  He 
suggested  that in the example  of  the  Barro-Gordon  model,  the lowest 
possible  level of inflation is an equilibrium that should be easy to coordi- 
nate on. 
Nancy  Stokey agreed that the dichotomy  between  rules and discretion 64  DISCUSSION 
can be overdrawn,  and that reputation is important. She noted that while 
Argentina's  currency board  and  peg  to  the  dollar  had  implied  a very 
strong rule for monetary policy, it was a rule the government had proved 
unable to maintain. On multiplicity of reputational equilibria, Stokey sug- 
gested  that the role of the central bank is to be a cheerleader,  selecting 
an equilibrium  and persuading  the private sector to behave  accordingly. 
She added  that empirical research into the means through which  central 
banks do this would  be useful. 
Jonathan Parker drew attention to a little-known  feature of many mod- 
els with distortionary capital taxation. He explained  that in these models, 
time-consistency  problems  can usually  be eliminated  by taxing capital a 
lot in the initial period.  However,  he noted  that this result is a reversal 
of good and bad policy as economists usually see it, and that it is generally 
avoided  by assuming  that capitalism is better than socialism, or by focus- 
ing  on  stationary  Markov-perfect  equilibria.  He  commented  that  he 
would  like to see a better foundation  for the assumption  that the govern- 
ment should  not own  all of capital, by adding  to the model  reasons why 
government  is not good  at running  capital. He said that the interaction 
of this with time-consistency  issues is an interesting direction for research 
over the next 25 years. 
Alberto Alesina commented  on the contention in Nancy Stokey's paper 
that while  there might be many types of bad government,  there is essen- 
tially only one type of good  government.  He proposed  instead  the view 
that there can be  several  types  of good  government,  in particular in a 
nonrepresentative-agent  world.  For example,  a "good" government  rep- 
resenting  the interests of capital will  choose  a different policy  on capital 
and labor taxation from a "good" government  representing  the interests 
of labor. 
Ken Rogoff  questioned  Lars Svensson's  contention  in  his  discussion 
that conservative  central banks  do  not  lead  to  higher  output  variabil- 
ity in practice. He suggested  that Japan and Germany might be seen  as 
counterexamples. 
In conclusion,  Nancy  Stokey replied  to Lars Svensson's  comments  on 
the observability issue in his discussion.  She pointed out that in her simple 
model,  the instrument  is unobservable,  but the target is observable.  She 
commented  that  in  a  more  realistic  model,  the  observability  problem 
would  be whether central bankers are setting what they should be setting, 
a problem which would  be made much more complex if they were trying 
to hit a moving  target. 